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Recent media reports and press releases have created the 
impression that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on the verge of 
assuming an important role in corporate management. While, 
upon closer inspection, it turns out that these stories should not 
always be taken at face value, they clearly highlight AI’s 
growing importance in management and hint at the enormous 
changes that corporate leadership may experience in the 
future. This Article attempts to anticipate that future by 
exploring a thought experiment on corporate management and 
AI. It argues that it is not an insurmountable step from AI 
generating and suggesting expert decisions (which is already 
common today) to AI making these decisions autonomously. 
The Article then proceeds based on the assumption that next-
generation AI will be able to take over the management of 
business organizations and explores the corporate law and 
governance consequences of this development. In doing so, the 
Article focuses on the fundamental areas of corporate 
leadership and management structures, managerial liability, 
and the corporate purpose. It also considers the phenomenon 
of algorithmic entities and leaderless entities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, a Hong Kong based venture capital firm, Deep 
Knowledge Ventures, thrust us into a new age of corporate 
management. The firm announced in a press release that it 
“appointed VITAL, a machine learning program capable of 
making investment recommendations in the life science 
sector, to its board.”1 Two years later, Finnish IT company 
Tieto informed the public that it “appointed Artificial 
Intelligence as a member of the leadership team of its new 
data-driven businesses unit.”2 Similarly, in early 2018, the 
 
1 Charles Groome, Deep Knowledge Ventures Appoints Intelligent 
Investment Analysis Software VITAL as Board Member, CISION PRWEB 
(May 13, 2014), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2014/05/ prweb 
11847458.htm [https://perma.cc/9U8D-Q94X].  
2 Press Release, Tieto, Tieto the First Nordic Company to Appoint 
Artificial Intelligence to the Leadership Team of the New Data-driven 
Businesses Unit (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.tieto.com/news/tieto-the-first-
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CEO of California-based software provider SalesForce 
revealed that he brings an artificial intelligence machine 
named “Einstein” to weekly staff meetings. He further noted 
that he asks Einstein to comment on proposals under 
discussion, describing how on one occasion the machine 
questioned whether a particular executive “is going to make 
their number.”3 
Several media outlets reacted promptly, with4 one 
newspaper even asking its readers whether they would “take 
orders from a robot.”5 In the case of VITAL, it turned out that 
initial reports were technically incorrect, given that Hong 
Kong law does not allow non-human entities to serve on 
boards.6 The phenomenon was also exaggerated, as Deep 
Knowledge Ventures later acknowledged that VITAL’s role 
“was a little different from that of human directors,” noting 
that the firm treats the software “as a member of our board 
with observer status” on the basis of an agreement that the 




3 David Reid, Marc Benioff Brings an A.I. Machine Called Einstein to 
His Weekly Staff Meeting, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/25/davos-2018-ai-machine-called-einstein-
attends-salesforce-meetings.html [https://perma.cc/9CN9-Y6TV]. 
4 See e.g., Nicky Burrdige, Artificial Intelligence Gets a Seat in the 
Boardroom, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 10, 2017), 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Artificial-intelligence-gets-a-
seat-in-the-boardroom [https://perma.cc/2HZQ-5WMU]; Algorithm 
Appointed Board Director, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-27426942 [https://perma.cc/59ED-
JFEN]; Simon Sharwood, Software ‘Appointed to Board’ of Venture Capital 
Firm, REG. (May 18, 2014), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/18/software_appointed_to_board_of_ 
venture_capital_firm [https://perma.cc/Z2B7-AW93].  
5 Ellie Zolfagharifard, Would You Take Orders from a Robot? An 
Artificial Intelligence Becomes the World’s First Company Director, DAILY 
MAIL (May 19, 2014), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2632920/Would-orders-ROBOT-Artificial-intelligence-world-s-company-
director-Japan.html [https://perma.cc/VX55-PFNF]. 
6 See Sharwood, supra note 4. 
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corroboration by VITAL.”7 As one commentator noted, this 
arrangement was no different from practices at other financial 
companies that use large data searches to survey markets and 
generate suggestions for boards or managers.8  
Although the claims in the above-mentioned and similar 
news items may not always be taken at face value, they clearly 
highlight the growing importance of artificial intelligence 
(“AI”) in corporate management and hint at the potentially 
enormous changes that corporate leadership may experience 
in the relatively near future. This Article attempts to 
anticipate that future by exploring a thought experiment on 
corporate management and artificial intelligence. It argues 
that the step from AI generating and suggesting expert 
decisions for managers (which in some areas is already 
common today) to AI making these decisions autonomously is 
hardly insurmountable.  
On a terminological note, there is currently no singular, 
universally accepted definition of AI.9 In fact, as one 
commentator has noted, “AI is an umbrella term, comprised 
by many different techniques” and notably includes the  
cutting-edge approaches of machine learning and deep 
learning.10 This Article construes AI broadly, invoking a 
classic definition by John McCarthy, the late Stanford 
scientist often credited with coining the term artificial 
intelligence.11 McCarthy described AI as “the science and 
 
7 Burrdige, supra note 4. 
8 See Algorithm Appointed, supra note 4 (citing Professor Noel 
Sharkey). 
9 PETER STONE ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030: 
REPORT OF THE 2015 STUDY PANEL 12 (2016),  
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9861/f/ai_100_report_0831fnl.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BN9A-3CQA].  
10 Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 405, 407 (2017) (“[M]any of the devices and services 
we access today—from iPhone autocorrect to Google Images—leverage 
trained pattern recognition systems or complex algorithms that a generous 
definition of AI might encompass.”). 
11 See V. Rajaraman, John McCarthy – Father of Artificial Intelligence, 
19 RESONANCE 198 (2014), 
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engineering of making intelligent machines, especially 
intelligent computer programs.”12 This definition is better 
suited for our purposes than a definition of AI as an 
approximation of human intelligence,13 because it leaves open 
the possibility that AI will eventually exceed humans’ 
cognitive capacity and represent an entirely separate category 
of intelligence. As McCarthy noted, AI is related to using 
computers to understand human intelligence, but is not 
necessarily confined to methods that are biologically 
observable.14 
Based on this understanding of AI, and based on the 
assumption that as AI further evolves it will be able to take 
over the management of corporations, this Article will explore 
the potential corporate law and governance consequences of 
this development. In doing so, it focuses on the fundamental 
areas of corporate leadership and management structures, 
managerial liability, and the corporate purpose. While the 
foregoing Parts of the Article will describe the consequences 
of AI management based on the underlying assumption that 
ultimate control of AI-led businesses remains with human 
shareholders, the final Section will discuss algorithmic 
entities (“AEs”) and leaderless entities as particular forms of 
potential future corporate management/leadership models. 
AEs are legal entities that are not only fully managed by 
software, but, once established, are also otherwise devoid of 
any ongoing human involvement. Leaderless entities are 
organizations that function without a centralized 




12 John McCarthy, What is AI?/Basic Questions, 
http://jmc.stanford.edu/artificial-intelligence/ what-is-ai/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/4MUH-4XWF].  
13 For example, a dictionary provides AI as “the capability of a machine 
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” Artificial Intelligence, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20intelligence [https://perma.cc/K2YV-
AMND].    
14 McCarthy, supra note 12.  
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unlikely to become a dominant leadership model in the future 
given the persistent need for centralized management. 
On leadership and management, the Article suggests that 
AI will usher in the end of the corporate board. It posits that 
AI will gradually replace human directors on boards, leading 
to “fused boards” where the various roles and inputs 
previously provided by a collective of human directors are 
incorporated into a single software program or algorithm, 
whose performance will be superior to today’s human-led 
governance. AI will also replace human officers and managers 
below the board level. For reasons more fully explained below, 
these developments will eventually make the separation 
between boards of directors and management  obsolete and 
lead to the “fused management” of corporations, with 
companies being managed comprehensively by a single AI 
unit. The Article also predicts that in the future, large 
commercial AI management software providers will offer 
these services to companies for sale or hire.15 
Another area that is set to experience changes in an AI-
dominated future is the corporate purpose. That is, to manage 
businesses, AI will require highly specific target outcomes, 
which will lead to more clearly defined corporate aims and 
strict implementations of corporate mission statements. 
Although AI managed entities, especially in the absence of 
human controllers, may provide a cover for illicit activities, 
the rise of AI also offers the potential for meaningful positive 
changes in terms of defining the corporate objective. 
Additionally, because AI can efficiently handle high degrees 
of complexity, AI-managed businesses will be in a better 
position to pursue multiple objectives simultaneously—
specifically, the interests of multiple stakeholders—and 
optimize the outcomes of several objectives at once within 
given constraints. Shareholder wealth maximization as a 
singular corporate goal may thus become largely a concept of 
 
15 While the following will not attempt to describe what AI corporate 
leadership will specifically look like in terms of its physical appearance, it 
suffices here to suggest that this could range from purely software-based 
applications, combinations of software with laptop or tablet like hardware, 
to human-resembling robots that can listen and speak. 
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the past. At the very least, basic corporate responsibility 
should be expected to improve as AI management software is 
programmed to be aware of and strictly adhere to all 
applicable laws. 
In this new world, directors’ and officers’ personal liability 
will change as well. In an initial phase, when humans and AI 
still work together on boards and in management, a number 
of challenging legal questions concerning personal liability 
will arise, including the extent to which human managers can 
and should monitor AI, and to what extent they may delegate 
tasks to machines without exposing themselves to personal 
liability. In a later phase, when AI dominate the management 
and governance of corporations, today’s framework will either 
vanish completely, evolve into a system in which the artificial 
AI entities/managers themselves can be sued, or be replaced 
with a system akin to today’s products liability paradigm. 
Under the latter system, which is arguably the most likely 
option, corporations and shareholders, instead of using the 
modern derivative action framework, would be able to bring 
actions against the developers and providers of AI 
management software based on faults in design and similar 
claims. Additionally, or as an alternative to fault liability, this 
system could also allow for strict liability against software 
developers and providers.  
II. CAN AI TAKE OVER? 
This Part will address the fundamental question of 
whether and to what extent AI can assume corporate 
management tasks. It begins with a brief examination of the 
tasks that today’s corporate directors, officers, and managers 
carry out. These tasks can be roughly divided into 
administrative tasks and non-administrative tasks 
(“judgment work”). This bifurcation proves useful in mapping 
managerial tasks onto AI roles and capabilities. AI seems 
poised to take over completely in the area of administrative 
managerial tasks, however, disagreement persists over AI’s 
role when it comes to non-administrative judgment work, 
which includes corporate leadership tasks relating to 
strategy, innovation, creative thinking, and people 
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management.16 Still, some commentators convincingly 
demonstrate that AI will likely reach and even exceed human-
level skills in the area of judgment work as well.17 This 
development would allow AI to assume all the tasks of today’s 
directors and managers, allowing AI to take over the future 
leadership of business corporations. 
A. Corporate Leadership Tasks 
1. Directors 
Given the corporate board’s importance in decisionmaking, 
it may come as a surprise that the law offers little guidance 
on the tasks it must or should perform. While some 
jurisdictions provide detailed enumerations of (sometimes 
non-delegable) board powers,18 the U.S. does not. The 
Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”), for 
instance, states that “[t]he business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of 
a board of directors.”19 This general reference to 
“management” by the board would, by itself, represent a 
misleading or at least highly inaccurate description of what 
modern boards do. It is only the DGCL’s additional reference 
to corporations being managed “under the direction” of the 
board that provides a more accurate reflection of 
contemporary governance. Public companies are rarely 
managed by the board. Rather, the board transfers significant 
managerial responsibilities to officers and managers.20 In 
turn, the board supervises management and only retains for 
itself a limited number of high-level managerial tasks.21  
 
16 See infra Section II.B.2. 
17 See id. 
18 See, e.g., OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR][Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 
1911, SR 220, art. 716a (Switz.). 
19 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (emphasis added). 
20 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 74 (2008). 
21 Id.; see also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 
968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Legally, the board itself will be required only to 
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Indeed, over the course of the last several decades, 
monitoring has become the accepted core function of Anglo-
American boards.22 Instead of “managing” the company, 
boards—to a large extent—entrust full-time executives with 
this role, including running the company on a daily basis and 
delegating certain tasks and responsibilities further down the 
corporate hierarchy to employees.23 Directors’ focus on 
supervision instead of management is also a necessity that is 
dictated by the fundamental modus operandi of the modern 
board. Today’s boards are part-time, intermittent, 
decisionmaking bodies.24 Boards only meet periodically, and 
the majority of board members are not employees of the 
company on whose board they sit—that is, they may also have 
other board mandates.25 In practice, this setup makes it 
impossible for boards to comprehensively manage a company 
on a daily basis. 
Although monitoring is the board’s chief role, it is not 
limited to this task. Modern boards take on a multi-faceted 
role that combines supervision with a number of other 
activities.26 For example, boards set their corporations’ 
 
authorize the most significant corporate acts or transactions: mergers, 
changes in capital structure, fundamental changes in business, 
appointment and compensation of the CEO, etc.”).  On the functions of U.S. 
and U.K. boards, see also MARC MOORE & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: LAW, REGULATION AND THEORY 174–77 (2017), which this 
Section partially relies on. 
22 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom, 
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 65, 73–74 (2017). For a pioneering work on 
the monitoring board model, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE CORPORATION 165 (photo reprt. 2006) (1976) (“[T]he role of the board is 
to hold executives accountable for adequate results (whether financial, 
social, or both), while the role of the executives is to determine how to 
achieve these results.”).  
23 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 74. 
24 MOORE & PETRIN, supra note 21, at 176. 
25 See infra text accompanying note 29 and notes 150–54 (discussing 
the prevalence of independent directors and the limited time that directors 
typically spend on board work).  
26 See, e.g., DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS 234–36 (2nd ed. 2012); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of 
Corporate Boards, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 781–83 (2003); Joseph A. 
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strategic goals and retain certain managerial responsibilities, 
which consist, above all else, of appointing and terminating 
senior management personnel and approving major 
transactions.27 Furthermore, boards have a service and 
relational function in which  they provide advice and guidance 
to management and, in particular, to the CEO.28 This includes 
leveraging their contacts with a view to help “expand the 
company’s network by providing interlocks with potential 
suppliers, customers, sources of finance, and other potential 
providers of key organizational needs.”29 It also includes the 
directors’ role to act as a liaison with shareholders and other 
company stakeholders.30  
The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
provide a more detailed description of board functions. 
According to the Principles, there are eight key functions that 
corporate directors should fulfill:  
[1] Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major 
plans of action, risk management policies and 
procedures, annual budgets and business plans; 
setting performance objectives; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance; and 
overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions, 
and divestitures . . . [2] Monitoring the effectiveness of 
the company’s governance practices and making 
changes as needed . . . [3] Selecting, compensating, 
monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key 
executives and overseeing succession planning . . . [4] 
Aligning key executive and board remuneration with 
 
McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Understanding the Board of Directors 
after the Financial Crisis: Some Lessons for Europe, 41 J.L. & SOC’Y 121, 126 
(2014). 
27 Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: 
Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2014) 
(noting also that boards are required to approve mergers and related 
transactions, major asset sales, stock issuances, distributions of dividends, 
and amendments to the articles of incorporation, among others).  
28 See id.; see also Dallas, supra note 26, at 805–07. 
29 Bainbridge, supra note 22,  at 72 (footnote omitted). 
30 Id. at 73; see also Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1061–
62. 
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the longer term interests of the company and its 
shareholders . . . [5] Ensuring a formal and 
transparent board nomination and election process . . 
. [6] Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of 
interest of management, board members and 
shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets 
and abuse in related party transactions . . . [7] 
Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting 
and financial reporting systems, including the 
independent audit, and that appropriate systems of 
control are in place, in particular, systems for risk 
management, financial and operational control, and 
compliance with the law and relevant standards . . . 
[8] Overseeing the process of disclosure and 
communications. 31 
A series of surveys conducted by the consulting firm 
McKinsey & Company (“McKinsey”), sheds further light from 
inside the board on the nature of directors’ work, including 
where board members invest their time and, in total, how 
much time they dedicate to board-related work. According to 
the most recent iteration of the survey, directors dedicate 
twenty-four days per year on board matters.32 In terms of 
tasks, board members spend 27% of their time on strategy; 
20% on performance management; 13% on organizational 
structure, culture, and talent management; 12% on 
investments and mergers & acquisitions; 10% on core 
governance and compliance; 9% on risk management; and 9% 
on shareholder and stakeholder management.33 The 
McKinsey survey also notes that the distribution of time that 
boards spend on these tasks has been stable over the last few 
 
31 OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 47–50 
(2015), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YFV-JAPS]. 
32 Martin Hirt, et al., The Board Perspective: A Collection of McKinsey 




0Perspective_Number_2.ashx [https://perma.cc/8CJM-N223].  
33 Id. 
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years, with only slight changes compared to previous years.34 
Thus, strategy and performance management have been 
consistently ranked as areas boards spend the most time on, 
with respondents indicating that they would like to spend 
even more time on strategy in addition to organizational 
matters, such as structure, culture, and talent management.35 
2. Managers 
Boards’ focus on high-level tasks, with a particular 
emphasis monitoring and strategy, can generally be 
contrasted with the tasks managers perform. As in the case of 
boards, however, the law again offers only minimal guidance 
on the role and tasks of managers.36 To start, there is no legal 
definition of a “manager.” In fact, the term is sometimes 
broadly used as a label for both directors and other high-level 
decisionmakers within corporations.37 That is also the 
approach taken in later Sections of  this Article, where the use 
of the words “managers” or “management” will normally refer 
to all individuals with significant leadership and 
decisionmaking responsibility at various levels of the 
corporate hierarchy. For the purposes of the present Section, 
however, the term “managers” only designates those 
individuals that have the aforementioned leadership and 
decisionmaking attributes but are not (or, not only) directors.38 




36 As one academic observed, “[i]t is an ironic feature of Delaware law 
that neither its corporation statute nor its case law says very much about 
the responsibilities of the most influential actors . . . in corporate affairs, i.e. 
executive officers.” Lyman Johnson, Dominance by Inaction: Delaware’s 
Long Silence on Corporate Officers, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED?: 
EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 182, 184 (Stephen 
M. Bainbridge et al., eds., 2017). 
37 See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, Corporate Ethics, Agency, and the Theory of 
the Firm, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 309, 312 n.20 (2008) (defining managers as 
directors and officers). 
38 Managers may of course, in addition to their managerial role, serve 
on the board, but there is a difference between acts taken in their directorial 
capacity and their managerial capacity. 
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to, corporate officers. For their part, the DGCL and the Model 
Business Corporation Act (the “MBCA”) refer to officers 
numerous times without elaborating in any detail on their 
functions.39 In essence, both simply provide that corporations 
shall have  officers with such titles and duties as stated in the 
corporation’s bylaws or board resolutions.40  
The only officer role that the DGCL and MBCA specifically 
describe is that of the secretary, whose function consists of 
keeping and maintaining certain records and the minutes of 
directors’ and shareholders’ meetings.41 In practice, of course, 
most corporations choose to appoint several officers. Typically, 
“the CEO is the top of the hierarchy; the chief operating officer 
is the second-in-command and in charge of general operations; 
and the chief financial officer is primarily responsible for 
finances and financial risk.”42 These are the three principal 
officer roles, and the MBCA defines the individuals that serve 
in these roles, along with “any individual in charge of a 
principal business unit or function,” as “senior executives.”43 
However, it is not uncommon for corporations to appoint 
additional “chief officers” in a number of other fields of their 
business, such as information or privacy.44   
 
39 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 142(a) (2019); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT §§ 8.40–8.41 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). As one commentator noted, the 
definition of “officer” tends to be “fluid and context-specific.” Verity Winship, 
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied 
Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1195–96 (2013). It seems clear, however, 
that the hallmark of an officer is decision-making power that relates to 
important aspects of the business. See Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the 
Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 620 (2018) (“officers . . . control the actual 
workings of the corporation.”).  
40  § 142(a); §§ 8.40–8.41. While the DGCL seems to assume that 
corporations will have officers—referring to them no less than 167 times—
its § 142(d) also provides that “[a] failure to elect officers shall not dissolve 
or otherwise affect the corporation.” DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 142(d). A 
Delaware corporation could therefore operate without any officers.  
41 § 142(a); § 8.40(c). 
42 Bodie, supra note 39, at 653.  
43 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(8) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
44 Bodie, supra note 39, at 653. 
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Despite their sparse treatment in corporate statutes, the 
importance of managers is of course broadly recognized. 
Indeed, given that officers carry out important managerial 
responsibilities, they have a dominant role in corporate 
leadership and “exert[] immense power and influence over the 
corporation.”45 In defining managerial leadership in terms of 
more specific tasks, one can still refer to Peter Drucker’s 
classic description of the “five basic operations in the work of 
a manager.”46 According to Drucker, managerial work focuses 
on the following areas: (1) setting goals and objectives—
managers decide what needs to be done to reach them, and 
communicates them to the people whose performance is 
needed to attain them; (2) organization of work—managers 
analyze activities, decisions, and relations; classify and divide 
work into manageable activities and jobs; group units and jobs 
into organized structures; and select people for the 
management of units and for the jobs to be done; (3) 
motivation and communication—managers make teams out of 
those individuals who are responsible for various jobs, using 
the tools of communication in horizontal and vertical relations 
and through “people decisions” on pay, placement, and 
promotion; (4) measurement—managers establish targets and 
yardsticks; analyze, appraise, and interpret performance, and 
communicate the related meaning and outcomes to 
employees; (5) developing people—both in relation to others 
and themselves.47  
To be sure, managerial tasks differ depending on the 
individual’s specific job description, seniority within the 
organization, and the size and nature of the business they 
work for. For example, for officers who are the highest ranking 
managers of a corporation, typical tasks include “entering into 
ordinary business transactions, devising business strategies, 
setting business goals, managing risks, and generally working 
with subordinates to ‘[p]lan, direct, or coordinate operational 
 
45 Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Officer Accountability, 32 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 357, 367 (2016). 
46 PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, 
PRACTICES 400 (1974).  
47 Id. 
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activities.’”48 Conversely, a lower-level, non-officer manager 
might be in charge of managing a smaller business division or 
branch, organizing work schedules, or focusing on customer 
relations, among other responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, there are general categories of tasks that 
apply to managers across all hierarchical levels. In 2016, 
Accenture surveyed 1,770 managers from fourteen countries 
and seventeen different industries, which usefully described 
these categories.49 The survey respondents included managers 
across all levels, from an organization’s top management 
group to middle managers and front-line managers.50 
According to the survey, these managers spent 54% of their 
time on administrative coordination and control tasks; 30% on 
solving problems and collaborating; 10% on work involving 
strategy and innovation; and 7% on tasks relating to 
developing people and engaging with stakeholders.51 These 
results, especially the insight that managers spend 
substantial amounts of time on coordination and control 
tasks, are important to keep in mind given the issue discussed 
in the next Section—the significance of the distinction 
between administrative tasks and judgment work when it 
comes to AI’s potential roles in corporate management. 
B. AI and Corporate Leadership 
Having outlined the current tasks of corporate leadership, 
as exercised by directors and managers, this Section moves on 
to explore whether AI could assume these tasks. This Section 
starts by looking at potential roles that AI is capable of 
performing, with the distinguishing element between the 
various roles being the differing levels of AI autonomy. Next, 
 
48 Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 
67 BUS. L. 75, 78–79 (2011) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
49 VEGARD KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., ACCENTURE INST. FOR HIGH 
PERFORMANCE, THE PROMISE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: REDEFINING 
MANAGEMENT IN THE WORKFORCE OF THE FUTURE 6 (2016), 
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf32/ai_in_management_report.pd
f#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/YD22-ZWCB].  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 5. 
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it discusses the vital distinction between administrative tasks 
and judgment work, including how  corporate leadership tasks 
map onto this distinction, and what it means for assessing AI’s 
future in corporate management. While there is little doubt 
that so-called “administrative” tasks will be exclusively 
carried out by computers in the future, researchers are 
divided over the question of whether humans can be replaced 
when it comes to tasks that involve judgment and emotional 
intelligence.52 Nevertheless, this Section concludes that even 
in these areas the rise of AI is likely and that we are steering 
towards a future where “management by machine” will 
ultimately fully replace human directors and managers as 
business leaders. 
1. Potential Roles for AI 
Before assessing whether AI could take over corporate 
management functions, it is helpful to establish more 
generally what types of managerial roles AI technology can 
assume. In this respect, it is helpful to think of AI roles in 
reference to degrees of autonomy and proactivity. A broad 
system of categorization, which will also be employed in the 
following Section, distinguishes between three different types 
of AI roles. These roles are: (i) assisted AI; (ii) advisory AI; and 
(iii) autonomous AI.53 While the boundaries between the three 
categories are fluid and overlap to an extent, this 
classification offers a useful starting point for our discussion.  
  Assisted AI. The first potential role of AI is that of an 
assistant. In this form, AI has either a low level or no 
autonomy, which also means that productivity gains are more 
limited compared to other types of AI roles. Assisted AI 
applications are also examples of what can be labelled “narrow 
AI” or “soft AI”—that is, systems that “can do a better job on 
 
52 See infra Section II.B.2. 
53 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 17; ROBERT J. THOMAS ET AL., 
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a very specific range of tasks than humans can” but, because 
of their limitations, they “would never be mistaken for a 
human.”54 Importantly, while assisted AI may execute tasks 
on behalf of humans, it does not make any decisions itself.55  
Examples of commonly used assisted AI systems are 
Apple’s Siri and its Android rival, the Google Assistant, which 
can support users by carrying out tasks such as placing calls 
or composing text/email messages based on voice prompts; 
setting reminders and alarms; keeping track of appointments 
and schedules; turning on lights and playing music; or looking 
up information on the internet. Applied in a business context, 
assisted AI could take notes, compile work and meeting 
schedules, prepare reports, maintain scorecards, or fulfill help 
desk and customer service functions.56 Depending on the level 
of complexity of these systems, they may also be close to or 
overlap with the next category of advisory AI. 
  Advisory AI. The second potential role of AI is advisory 
in nature. In this demanding role, AI can provide “support in 
more complex problem solving and decisionmaking situations 
by asking and answering questions as well as building 
scenarios and simulations.”57 Advisory AI has a heightened 
level of autonomy, which leads to increased productivity 
compared to assisted AI. Still, decisionmaking rights either 
 
54 VIVEK WADHWA & ALEX SALKEVER, THE DRIVER IN THE DRIVERLESS 
CAR 38 (2017). 
55 See Anand Rao, AI Everywhere & Nowhere Part 3 – AI is AAAI 




56 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 17. Specifically for 
scheduling and project management, see the tools described in NILS J. 
NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 509 (2010). The most 
advanced software in this respect appears to be the Aurora system, which 
is marketed as “the world’s leading intelligent planning and scheduling 
software solution that utilizes advanced artificial intelligence” and being 
capable of “incorporating the judgment and experience of expert human 
schedulers.” Aurora, STOTTLER HENKE, 
https://www.stottlerhenke.com/products/aurora [https://perma.cc/ZFD7-
9TG5]. 
57 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 17. 
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remain with human users or are at most shared between 
humans and machines.58 Advisory AI is sometimes called 
“augmented intelligence.”59 The augmentation refers to a 
combination of artificial and human intelligence, in which AI 
does not replace human intelligence, but leverages or 
improves it by, for example, giving information and advice 
that would otherwise be unavailable or more difficult and time 
consuming to obtain.60 Augmentation can also mean that 
“humans and machines learn from each other and redefine the 
breadth and depth of what they do together.”61  
A particularly salient example of augmented AI is IBM’s 
Watson platform. Among other achievements, Watson is 
known for repeatedly beating two human champions at the 
game show “Jeopardy” in 2011.62 Watson’s use, of course, goes 
far beyond trivia and games. It excels in different 
environments at a multitude of serious tasks, including 
medical diagnosis, wealth management and financial advice, 
legal due diligence, and sales coaching.63  
 Autonomous AI. The third and most advanced role of AI 
is that of an actor. AI in this category can “proactively and 
autonomously evaluate options—making decisions or 
challenging the status quo.”64 Crucially, in contrast to the 
previous two categories, when it comes to autonomous AI “the 
decision rights are with the machine.”65 Today, perhaps the 
most prominent example of autonomous AI is the advent of 
the fully autonomous vehicle, whose emergence, according to 
companies such as Alphabet Inc.’s subsidiary Waymo, Tesla, 
 
58 See Rao, supra note 55. 
59 Id. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. 
62 John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html? 
[https://perma.cc/D82S-Q4B2]. 
63 See id.; Conner Forrest, IBM Watson: What Are Companies Using It 
for?, ZDNET (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.zdnet.com/article/ibm-watson-
what-are-companies-using-it-for [https://perma.cc/XQ2H-N8LN]. 
64 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 17.  
65 Rao, supra note 55. 
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Uber, and others, will soon become reality.66 In the corporate 
management context, there are already several specific 
autonomous AI applications in use. They perform tasks such 
as autonomous robotic trading of securities and handling of 
loan applications.67 The use of such systems is not yet 
widespread, but are, according to an Accenture study on the 
promise of artificial intelligence, “increasingly becoming 
commonplace.”68 
2. Administrative Work vs. Judgment Work 
The previous Section considered the types of roles that AI 
can assume with reference to the differing types of AI and 
their corresponding levels of autonomy and productivity. The 
present Section moves to consider the types of tasks that may 
be suitable for AI. An important distinction to keep in mind 
when thinking about whether AI can take over corporate 
management is between administrative work and judgment 
work.69  
The Accenture study referred to above describes 
administrative work in the corporate management context as 
consisting of “[a]dministrative and routine tasks, such as 
 
66 See, e.g., Jeb Su, Tesla Could Have Full Self-Driving Cars on the 




67 Examples of existing AI-based software can be found in NILSSON, 
supra note 56, at 507–13 and KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 17. 
Particularly interesting is the description of a business intelligence tool 
whose “[c]onclusions are used to communicate policy, late-breaking 
business opportunities, and needs for action” which can trigger “automatic 
actions such as ordering, sending e-mails, and so on.” NILSSON, supra note 
56, at 510–11. On algorithmic trading, see for example Gregory Scopino, 
Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for 
Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 439, 439 (2015); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 678, 687–693 (2013).  
68 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 17. 
69 See id. at 3–4, 11–14. 
5_2019.3_PETRIN (DO NOT DELTE) 1/8/2020  4:46 PM 
984 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
scheduling, allocation of resources, and reporting.”70 
Administrative work can be broadly contrasted with judgment 
work. For our purposes here, judgment work  may be defined 
as work that requires creative, analytical, and strategic 
skills.71 The Accenture study defines it as “the application of 
human experience and expertise to critical business decisions 
and practices when the information available is insufficient to 
suggest a successful course of action or [is not] reliable enough 
to suggest an obvious best course of action.”72 Judgment can 
be individual, but will often be collective, particularly in more 
complex situations. It may therefore involve teamwork and 
“specific interpersonal skills; namely, social networking, 
people development and coaching, and collaboration.”73 In line 
with the inclusion of interpersonal skills, emotional 
intelligence can be treated as a subcategory of judgment.74 
As we have seen, non-director managers indicate that they 
spend more than 50% of their time on administrative tasks. 
The remaining non-administrative tasks, as per the 
Accenture study’s definitional framework, consists of 
judgment work. These tasks pertain to problem solving and 
collaboration, strategy and innovation, and relations with 
individuals and stakeholders.  
The situation of managers, who clearly spend considerable 
time on administrative tasks, contrasts with directors’ focus. 
The bulk of directors’ work falls into the category of judgment 
work (as defined in the Accenture study, tasks that require 
decisionmaking based on human experience and expertise due 
to insufficient data or information). More specifically, as a 
rough estimate based on the above-mentioned McKinsey 
 
70 Id. at 4. 
71 See id. at 11. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 13. 
74 See Ajay Agrawal et al., What to Expect from Artificial Intelligence, 
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Spring 2017, at 23, 26, 
http://ilp.mit.edu/media/news_articles/smr/2017/58311.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9R8K-N7KT]. 
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survey on board tasks, judgment work appears to make up at 
least 75% of directors’ time and workload.75  
The importance of the distinction between administrative 
and judgment work lies in the  likelihood of the respective 
tasks being assumed by AI in the future. Based on their 
research and broad survey of managers, the authors of the 
Accenture study found that “artificial intelligence will soon be 
able to do the administrative tasks that consume much of 
managers’ time faster, better, and at a lower cost”76 and 
concluded that  “AI will put an end to administrative 
management work.”77 The nascent literature on AI and 
management does not appear to challenge the idea that 
administrative work will be the exclusive domain of AI in the 
future.78 
While the prospect of being relieved of administrative work 
may come as welcome news to many managers, the question 
then arises as to what role AI can play in the remaining 
managerial tasks that consist of non-administrative work. In 
this area, commentators have expressed widely diverging 
views on the future role of AI in management. 
 
75 Hirt, supra note 32, at 49. We assume that tasks pertaining to 
strategy, organizational structure, culture, talent management, and 
shareholder and stakeholder management consist of judgment work. 
Further, we assume that at least half of performance management, 
investments and M&A, core governance and compliance, and risk 
management tasks are judgment work as well. Adding the time spent on 
these tasks together suggests that judgment work makes up approximately 
72% of overall board tasks.  
76 Vegard Kolbjørnsrud et al., How Artificial Intelligence Will Redefine 
Management, HARV. BUS. REV. ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/11/how-artificial-intelligence-will-redefine-
management [https://perma.cc/2DSJ-UXFH]. 
77 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 3. The study mentions tasks 
such as note taking, scheduling, reporting, maintaining scorecards, 
managing shift schedules, and generating investor statements and 
management reports as specific examples of AI-led administrative work. Id. 
at 4, 11, 17.  
78 The literature reviewed for this section of the article explicitly or 
implicitly accepted the idea that administrative tasks will be dominated by 
AI and related new technologies. 
5_2019.3_PETRIN (DO NOT DELTE) 1/8/2020  4:46 PM 
986 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
A first group of commentators sees only a limited role for 
AI in judgment work. For instance, the Accenture study 
authors suggest that, apart from a limited number of specific 
applications, human managers in business will generally 
prevail in and increasingly focus on judgment work.79 The 
study suggests that in the context of judgment work the role 
of AI will remain advisory in nature, with machines 
supporting and augmenting the work of human managers, but 
not taking on the role of independent actors.80 It is this type 
of augmentation that the study suggests holds the greatest 
potential for AI-driven value creation.81 
The Accenture study provides two examples to illustrate 
its view that human judgment cannot be replaced by AI. First, 
it notes that in the context of big data marketing and sales 
campaigns, “analytics-driven short-term results may come at 
the expense of long-term brand building [and] strategies . . . 
which cannot easily be suggested by data.”82 It is therefore up 
to human marketing executives, the study suggests, to “use 
judgment—combining analytics with their own and others’ 
insight and experience, and by balancing short and long-term 
priorities.”83 Second, the study uses the example of evaluating 
job applications. It argues that even if AI systems “can 
measure and opine on a candidate’s facial expressions, 
mannerisms and vocal inflections, they may not be able to 
assess that individual’s compatibility with the attitudes and 
history of the company’s existing workforce. These decisions 
 
79 See KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 13–15. 
80 See id. at 15. 
81 Id. As one commentator suggested, there are three possible outcomes 
when thinking about the impact of machines on human employment. Robots 
and AI will (1) take almost all of the jobs, as they are better than humans 
at every task; (2) take some jobs but humans will remain dominant in 
positions such as those that are too complex or require emotional, social, or 
artistic skills; or (3) take none of the jobs in the sense that while certain jobs 
will be eliminated others will be created at roughly the same rate. See 
BYRON REESE, THE FOURTH AGE: SMART COMPUTERS, CONSCIOUS COMPUTERS, 
AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY 85–121 (2018). Reese believes that the third 
outcome is the most likely scenario. Id. at 98. 
82 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 11. 
83 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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require human awareness of the organization’s context and 
history.”84 For this reason, the study concludes that human 
managers will remain the ultimate decisionmakers when it 
comes to managerial tasks requiring judgment.  
Another study, authored by Professors Agrawal, Gans and 
Goldfarb, begins by emphasizing AI’s superiority in data 
gathering and prediction tasks.85 Prediction in this context is 
understood as the ability to use acquired information or facts 
to anticipate future events (e.g., if a customer will default on 
a loan) and human actions (e.g., what a human driver would 
do in a given situation).86 Prediction can also relate to present 
conditions, such as predicting a future medical condition by 
evaluating currently observable symptoms.87 While AI excels 
at prediction, a different question is whether on this basis, 
beyond identifying probable occurrences, it can reliably 
initiate appropriate actions.  
According to Agrawal and his co-authors, replicating 
human judgment is possible, but its feasibility depends on the 
necessary level of judgment involved in an action and the ease 
of defining desired outcomes in terms of “something a machine 
can understand.”88 While the authors make the point that in 
the coming years our understanding of human judgment will 
improve and become subject to increasing automation,89 they 
nevertheless believe that a need for human judgment will 
prevail in certain situations and contexts.90 They predict as 
likely “that organizations will have [a] continuing demand for 
people who can make responsible decisions (requiring ethical 
 
84 Id. 
85 See Agrawal et al., supra note 74, at 23–24. Indeed, it is commonly 
accepted that machines are better at data gathering and analysis than 
humans, suggesting that these areas will be dominated by AI. See, e.g., 
Megan Beck & Barry Libert, The Rise of AI Makes Emotional Intelligence 
More Important, HARV. BUS. REV. ONLINE (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/02/the-rise-of-ai-makes-emotional-intelligence-more-
important [https://perma.cc/A8Q6-LAXE]. 
86 See Agrawal et al., supra note 74, at 24. 
87 See id.  
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 24–25. 
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judgment), engage customers and employees (requiring 
emotional intelligence), and identify new opportunities 
(requiring creativity).”91 Finally, these authors also suggest 
that human judgment will be required when deciding how 
best to apply AI.92 This presumably includes the decision of 
when we should rely on judgment by AI, although this 
decision itself will likely be supported by AI and its insights 
into the benefits of using it in a given situation. 
Echoing the general sentiment of the Accenture study and 
the work of Agrawal and his coauthors, Beck and Libert have 
remarked that “[t]hose who want to stay relevant in their 
professions will need to focus on skills and capabilities that 
artificial intelligence has trouble replicating—understanding, 
motivating, and interacting with human beings.”93 They argue 
that although machines may be able to diagnose complex 
business problems and recommend actions to improve an 
organization, human beings are “still best suited to jobs like 
spurring [a] leadership team to action, avoiding political hot 
buttons, and identifying savvy individuals to lead change.”94 
Beck and Libert have also identified areas of decision making 
where they believe AI performs better than humans. They 
note that “[a]rtificial intelligence for both strategic 
decisionmaking (capital allocation) and operating 
decisionmaking will come to be an essential competitive 
advantage, just like electricity was in the industrial 
revolution or enterprise resource planning software (ERP) 
was in the information age.”95 However, in Beck and Libert’s 
view, AI in the boardroom “is not about automating leadership 
 
91 Id. at 26. 
92 Id. 
93 Beck & Libert, supra note 85 (“A smart machine might be able to 
diagnose an illness and even recommend treatment better than a doctor. It 
takes a person, however, to sit with a patient, understand their life situation 
(finances, family, quality of life, etc.), and help determine what treatment 
plan is optimal.”). 
94 Id. 
95 Barry Libert et al., AI in the Boardroom: The Next Realm of 
Corporate Governance, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/ article/ai-in-the-boardroom-the-next-realm-of-
corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/AE98-DC8R].  
5_2019.3_PETRIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2020  4:46 PM 
No. 3:965] CORPORATE MANAGEMENT IN THE AGE OF AI 989 
and governance, but rather augmenting board intelligence.”96 
This corresponds to the view of AI as an assistant and advisor, 
rather than a replacement, for the board. 
Frey and Osborne also provide support for the view that 
managerial judgment work is not about to be replaced by 
machines. In a study examining over 700 occupations and 
their susceptibility to computerization,97 Frey and Osborne 
found that around forty-seven percent of total US employment 
is in the high-risk category and “could be automated relatively 
soon, perhaps over the next decade or two.”98 The study 
suggests that generalist occupations requiring knowledge of 
human heuristics and specialist occupations involving the 
development of novel ideas and artifacts are the least 
susceptible to computerization.99  
Specifically with regard to managers, Frey and Osborne 
noted that chief executives represent “a prototypical example 
of generalist work requiring a high degree of social 
intelligence,” as evidenced by tasks such as “conferring with 
board members, organization officials, or staff members to 
discuss issues, coordinate activities, or resolve problems” and 
“negotiating or approving contracts or agreements.”100 Frey 
and Osborne thus predict “that most management, business, 
and finance occupations, which are intensive in generalist 
tasks requiring social intelligence” are at a low risk of being 
automated.101 However, it is notable that Frey and Osborne’s 
contemplated timeline is relatively short. They note that 
“occupations that involve complex perception and 
manipulation tasks, creative intelligence tasks, and social 
intelligence tasks are unlikely to be substituted by computer 
 
96 Id. 
97 See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of 
Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 254 (2017). 
98 Id. at 268. 
99 Id. at 266. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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capital over the next decade or two.”102 This suggests that 
beyond this timeframe their study does not exclude the 
possibility of such jobs, including management roles, 
becoming automated as well. 
A contrast to the view that human judgment, including 
emotional intelligence, is at its core irreplaceable—leading to 
a future where AI and human managers would work 
together—is the vision of AI’s complete replacement of 
management. The Accenture study notes that some managers 
are already questioning “whether the manager role as we 
know it will survive,” with a large UK financial institution’s 
Chief Information Officer recently opining that advances in 
technology may lead to a world where “we may not need 
managers.”103 Similarly, in a chapter on the rise of “robo-
directors” and their corporate law implications, one academic 
opined that “technology will probably soon offer the possibility 
of artificial intelligence not only supporting directors, but 
even replacing them.”104 
Relevant work to our question of AI’s potential future role 
in corporate management has also been produced by authors 
that specialize more generally in predictions about the future 
of humanity.105 Some of these authors challenge the idea that 
there are certain areas or tasks at which humans will always 
outperform machines. In particular, several commentators 
believe that machines can be better than humans (or in some 
instances already are better) when it comes to judgment work. 
 
102 Id. at 262 (emphasis added). They note that it is in principle also 
possible to automate creative tasks, especially outside of the artistic-
creative sector but rather in, for example, designing statistical data models. 
See id.; see also WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 54, at 38–39 (describing 
creative capabilities of AI in the areas of writing, music, poetry, and art). 
103 KOLBJØRNSRUD ET AL., supra note 49, at 4. 
104 Florian Möslein, Robots in the Boardroom: Artificial Intelligence 
and Corporate Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 649 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018).  
105 For an overview of various high-profile thinkers’ stance on the 
future of AI in general (beyond management and judgment work), see 
Spyros Makridakis, The Forthcoming Artificial Intelligence (AI) Revolution: 
Its Impact on Society and Firms, 90 FUTURES 46, 50–53 (2017) 
(distinguishing between optimists, pessimists, pragmatists, and doubters). 
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They predict the rise of emotionally intelligent AI, arguing 
that emotional intelligence is a function of “biological 
algorithms” that machines will be able to replicate.106 Some 
commentators also expect the emergence of artificial general 
intelligence (“general AI”), which will match the intelligence 
of humans in all areas, or even superintelligent AI, which will 
far exceed human intelligence.107 
Nick Bostrom, for instance, writes that for advanced forms 
of AI, all intellectual abilities will be within a system’s reach, 
including cognitive modules and skills such as “empathy, 
political acumen, and any other powers stereotypically 
wanting in computer-like personalities.”108 Indeed, a 
“superintelligent” machine, a concept that Bostrom sees as 
potentially emerging in the future, would not only excel at 
typical computer skills, but also at tasks including 
strategizing (strategic planning, forecasting, prioritizing, 
analysis to optimize the  chance of achieving distant goals), 
social manipulation (social and psychological modeling, 
manipulation, rhetoric persuasion), and economic activity.109 
These skills are of course also essential for corporate 
management and, if replicated by machines, would allow for 
the creation of autonomous artificial directors and managers. 
 
106 See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, HOMO DEUS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
TOMORROW 83–86 (HarperCollins 2017) (2015).  
107 On the concepts of artificial general intelligence and more advanced 
forms, see NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, 
STRATEGIES 22–29, 52–61 (2014).  
108 Id. at 92. Tegmark similarly believes that intuition and creativity 
will be—and to some extent already have been—mastered by machines. 
MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 87–89 (2017). Nevertheless, Tegmark suggests that in the 
future, jobs requiring personal interactions, social intelligence, and 
creativity will likely be safer than others from being taken over by 
machines. Id. at 121–22. 
109 See BOSTROM, supra note 107, at 94. Bostrom explores different 
possible paths to reach superintelligence—AI, whole brain emulation, 
biological cognition, and human-machine interfaces—and finds that “[the] 
existence of multiple paths increases the probability that the destination 
can be reached via at least one of them.” Id. at 22.  
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Similarly, Michio Kaku suggests that the creation of “true 
automatons, robots that have the ability to make their own 
decisions requiring only minimal human intervention” is the 
next step in the evolution of AI and robotic technology.110 
While he notes that the state of automatons today is 
“primitive,”111 he predicts that by the end of the century there 
will be self-aware robots, and even sooner, machines with 
innovative learning capabilities.112 A subsequent phase, Kaku 
speculates, will bring “self-replicating automatons . . . and 
quantum-fueled conscious machines.”113 
Finally, Richard and Daniel Susskind argue that “people, 
practices, and institutions” belonging to what they refer to as 
“the professions” will be largely replaced in the future.114 
Although they do not comment specifically on managers, 
which are outside of their discrete definition of “a profession,” 
they include “management consultants” as part of their 
analysis.115 Nevertheless, their conclusion that AI, big data, 
robotics, and other technological developments will replace 
even highly qualified human professionals because machines 
will be able to carry out the full range of tasks of these roles116 
can be applied to the case of corporate managers as well.  
Susskind and Susskind also describe the emerging field of 
affective computing, which allows sensor-equipped machines 
to detect, react to, and express human emotions.117 As they 
explain, machines are already capable of performing these 
tasks and work in the field is only advancing.118 In this vein, 
 
110 MICHIO KAKU, THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY: OUR DESTINY IN THE 
UNIVERSE 114 (2018). 
111 Id. at 136.  
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE 
PROFESSIONS: HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN 
EXPERTS 18 (2015).  
115 See id. at 15–16, 78–84. The other professions (or professionals) 
forming the authors’ main focal point are doctors, lawyers, teachers, 
accountants, tax advisers, architects, journalists, and the clergy. Id. at 1. 
116 See id. at 159–72.  
117 See id. at 170–72. 
118 See id.  
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Susskind and Susskind suggest that machines will be in a 
position to exhibit empathy, thus countering the views of 
those commentators that perceive the lack of such qualities as 
a major hurdle to the replacement of professionals by 
machines.119 Susskind and Susskind posit that while cognitive 
tasks, affective tasks, and moral judgment will be more 
difficult to automize than other tasks, machines will master 
them in the long run, leaving little space for human 
professionals.120 In several decades, these authors conclude, 
the mastery of judgment work by machines will erode the 
number of jobs available to human professionals. The final 
result of this, they suggest, will be “technological 
unemployment” in the professions.121 
C. Assessment 
Will AI be able to take over the tasks of human corporate 
directors and managers? It seems uncontroversial to answer 
this question in the positive with reference to administrative 
tasks, an area where, based on our daily experiences with 
virtual assistants, many people will have little difficulty 
imagining software in control. If administration remained the 
only area in which machines took over, we would see human 
managers and AI work together, with AI ultimately improving 
human productivity and decisionmaking quality. Nobody can 
predict with certainty, however, whether AI’s involvement in 
the future will also extend to the crucial area of judgment 
work. If AI is able to dominate that domain as well, it could  
lead to a world where machines, not humans, dominate 
corporate management.  
While acknowledging the uncertainties in making 
predictions, it is more difficult to believe that humans will 
always maintain their superiority in completing judgment 
work than imagining a future in which machines excel at 
these tasks as well. Eventually, AI—coupled with big data, 
increasingly powerful computing devices that will soon exceed 
 
119 See id. at 251–52. 
120 See id. at 279–81. 
121 Id. at 290–92. 
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human brain power,122 and technologies such as voice, facial 
expression, and gesture recognition—will appear to have all 
the tools in place to become much better at managing and 
manipulating human responses than humans themselves.123  
In contexts like emerging self-driving car technology, we 
already see AI judgment at work. The autonomous vehicle’s 
decision to break or not, for example, combines data gathering 
and analysis, prediction, judgment, and action.124 Of course, 
even this seemingly less complex judgment task can be 
difficult and even involve philosophical and legal 
conundrums, such as what course of action the machine 
should take when every possible option involves the loss of 
lives or other harmful consequences to third parties.125 Still, 
as algorithms can be fed any and all information that is 
available to humans, they should be able to exercise judgment 
that at least matches, and likely even exceeds, human 
judgment. 
If AI masters judgment work, it will also be able to engage 
in the various non-administrative tasks currently performed 
by corporate directors and managers. Although it seems alien 
to us, the literature outlined above indicates that the hurdles 
in realizing AI capable of performing judgment work are not 
insurmountable. AI that effectively interacts with employees 
and external stakeholders, including investors, governments, 
suppliers, customers, and communities, will, if these hurdles 
are cleared, become reality. While we may intuitively assume 
that machines are worse at such judgment-related tasks than 
 
122 Researchers project that silicon-based computer chips in laptops 
will match the power of a human brain in the early 2020s and that by 2023 
even smartphones will have more computing power than our brains. See 
WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 54, at 15–16. 
123 See Mikko Alasaarela, The Rise of Emotionally Intelligent AI, 
MACHINE LEARNINGS (October 9, 2017), https://machinelearnings.co/the-
rise-of-emotionally-intelligent-ai-fb9a814a630e [https://perma.cc/V8HV-
BGJB]. 
124 See Agrawal et al., supra note 74, at 24. 
125 See, e.g., Amy Maxmen, Self-Driving Car Dilemmas Reveal that 
Moral Choices Are Not Universal, NATURE (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07135-0 
[https://perma.cc/84RH-A8N4]. 
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humans, there is support for the notion that machines will 
eventually exceed human capabilities in areas requiring “soft 
skills.”126 
It is further incorrect to assume that replacing managerial 
jobs is necessarily more difficult than lower paid jobs that are 
thought to require a more basic skillset. While that hypothesis 
may be true generally, it is not always the case. One author 
has provided an illustrative example to support this point. 
“From a robot’s point of view,” Byron Reese queried, “which of 
these jobs requires more skill: a waiter or a highly trained 
cardiologist who interprets CT scans?”  127 The answer is that 
the waiter’s job is more challenging for robots. The waiter has 
to master “hundreds of skills, from spotting rancid meat to 
cleaning up baby vomit. But because we take all those things 
for granted, we don’t think they are all that hard. To a robot, 
the radiologist job is by comparison a cakewalk. It is just data 
in, probabilities out.”128 Using a variation of Reese’s example, 
we could ask: what is more difficult for a machine, assuming 
the role of a waiter, or a corporate manager? If we follow 
Reese’s logic, managerial tasks, which also often involve data 
analysis, might well be easier to automate.  
To be sure, the emergence of general AI and, as a next step, 
perhaps even superintelligent AI, is far from imminent and 
may not be achieved at all. However, neither type is the level 
of AI that is necessarily needed for effective corporate 
management by machines. In several specific areas AI already 
outperforms human intelligence, and a combination of 
different systems currently in use, appropriately improved, 
could be enough to replace managers and directors before the 
advent of general AI.  
Even if more advanced AI systems are a precondition for 
corporate management by machines, the emergence of such 
technologies may be much closer than we assume. According 
to Tegmark, leading AI experts are divided on the timeframe 
for an emergence of superhuman artificial general 
 
126 See supra notes 106–21 and accompanying text. 
127 REESE, supra note 81, at 107. 
128 Id. 
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intelligence, with “most of them making estimates ranging 
from decades to centuries[,] and some even guessing [it will] 
never [emerge].”129 Bostrom notes that “today, futurists who 
concern themselves with the possibility of artificial general 
intelligence still often believe that intelligent machines are a 
couple of decades away.”130 However, in a striking account, 
Bostrom and Müller relate the results of a 2013 survey 
conducted among 170 industry experts. In this survey, “[t]he 
median estimate of respondents was for a one in two chance 
that high-level machine intelligence will be developed around 
2040-2050, rising to a nine in ten chance by 2075.”131 Further, 
the survey showed that “[e]xperts expect that systems will 
move on to superintelligence in less than 30 years 
thereafter.”132 If these experts are correct, highly advanced AI 
could be a reality in 20 to 30 years, and enormous changes 
would thereby soon be upon us. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF AI MANAGEMENT 
The previous Part has argued that “management by 
machine” is possible—that is, a future in which AI will be 
capable of and will be used for carrying out the tasks that 
today are entrusted to human directors and managers. To be 
sure, there are many uncertainties: in addition to 
technological issues outlined above, it is not clear whether 
legislators will allow “AI management,” or whether human 
corporate promoters will be willing to appoint machines to 
managerial positions. Nevertheless, this Part proceeds on the 
assumption that AI management will indeed become a reality 
and, on this basis, explores the potential corporate governance 
consequences thereof. In doing so, the following Sections will 
focus on the governance/leadership structures within 
 
129 TEGMARK, supra note 108, at 130. 
130 BOSTROM, supra note 107, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
131 Vincent C. Müller & Nick Bostrom, Future Progress in Artificial 
Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1 (Vincent C. Müller, ed., 2016). 
132 Id. For a summary of similar surveys, see also Makridakis, supra 
note 105, at 52. 
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corporations; the impact of AI on directors’ and officers’ 
personal liability; AI-related consequences pertaining to the 
corporate purpose; and the emergence of algorithmic and 
leaderless entities. The discussion hypothesizes that a 
radically different framework of corporate management lies 
ahead. 
A. Corporate Boards 
1. Boards Today 
A fundamental feature of today’s board is its prevailing 
structure as a governance entity consisting of (1) individual 
human actors (as opposed to legal entities) that (2) work as a 
collective body or team. Both elements are, as the subsequent 
Section will show, in contradiction to what boards will likely 
look like in a future dominated by AI.   
The first fundamental feature of modern boards is a result 
of the fact that corporate laws typically preclude non-human 
actors from sitting on boards. Only natural persons are 
allowed to serve as directors of a corporation in all U.S. states 
and “most other major capitalist economies.”133 For their part, 
both the DGCL and the MBCA provide that every director 
needs to be a “natural person,”134 which precludes artificial 
persons from serving as board members.135 This long-standing 
restriction is aimed specifically at preventing legal entities 
and business associations from acting as board members.136 
An exception to this general rule was traditionally found in 
U.K. company law, which allowed legal entities to use 
 
133 Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 67 (providing references to other U.S. 
states and Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which all ban non-natural 
persons from serving as directors). 
134 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.03(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
135 Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 67 n.3. 
136 See Shawn J. Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business Entity 
Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 
98 (2015) (noting that the restriction probably stems from an interest to 
provide “clarity in decision making and of corporate structure”). 
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“corporate directors,” the British term for legal person 
directors, alongside at least one human director.137 However, 
this exception is set to disappear, with the U.K. set to join the 
U.S. and other jurisdictions in barring non-natural persons 
from board service.138  
In contrast to the requirement that boards consist of 
humans, the second element characterizing today’s boards, 
that corporate powers are conferred upon a group, is a matter 
of choice and practice—not necessarily a legal requirement. 
Both Delaware law and the MBCA now provide that boards 
may consist of one or more members, thereby leaving open the 
possibility of one-person boards.139 In contrast, corporate law 
in the United Kingdom requires public companies to have at 
least two directors.140 Legal requirements notwithstanding, 
however, larger companies in both the U.S. and U.K. normally 
choose to have multi-member boards, which, in turn, also form 
various multi-member committees. The assumption that 
boards are comprised of several members is also reflected in 
stock exchange rules, such as the NYSE Listed Company 
Manual, which are specifically geared towards large boards.141 
 
137 Section 155(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides that “[a] 
company must have at least one director who is a natural person.” 
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 155(1) (UK). On this, see Bainbridge, supra 
note 22, at 69–70 (noting also that in view of stock exchange listing rules 
the use of corporate directors under this provision of the Act seems to be 
limited to non-public, small companies). 
138 A new (but not yet effective) statute provides that, subject to certain 
exceptions, as a general rule directors must be natural persons. See Small 
Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, c. 26, § 87(4) (UK). For 
further background on the enactment of this provision, see Bainbridge, 
supra note 22, at 70–71. At the time of writing, it was not clear when the 
new U.K. rules on corporate directors might enter into force. 
139 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b); see also § 8.03. Previously, 
statutory requirements mandating a minimum of three directors were 
common, but these have today largely disappeared today. See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision Making in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 (2002).  
140 See Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 154 (UK). 
141 As Bainbridge and Henderson note, U.S. stock exchange rules and 
federal law such as rules implemented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
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To be sure, using a one-person board, with just one 
decisionmaker, would offer a number of advantages. Giving a 
single individual ultimate power over a company would offer 
enhanced decisionmaking efficiency compared to consensus-
based processes; circumvent difficulties in monitoring the 
performance of individual directors and their contributions in 
multi-member boards; and eradicate potential problems 
stemming from group dynamics between individual team 
members.142  
Yet the preference in practice for collective corporate 
boards is justified.143 There are various reasons dictating the 
superiority of collective boards and why a team structure will, 
on balance, tend to result in more rational, higher quality 
decisions.  First, an important cause is the enhanced access to 
information by groups, which also translates into an improved 
ability to overcome impediments to optimal decisionmaking 
due to cognitive and other human limitations (“bounded 
rationality”).144 That is, when forced to make decisions under 
complex and uncertain conditions, groups especially benefit 
from the combined inputs of their members in terms of 
knowledge and skills, which also has the positive effect of 
reducing individual biases.145 Further, the collective board 
model is useful for addressing agency costs within a board, as 
a team of directors can monitor each other and their internal 
decisionmaking.146 Finally, having multiple board members 
and the option to delegate tasks to specific members or 
specialized board committees is suitable for dealing with the 
 
Dodd Frank Act implicitly assume that directors are natural persons. See 
Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1100–01. 
142 See Bainbridge, supra note 139, at 12–41. 
143 See id. (providing a detailed account of advantages of group 
decision-making). 
144 See id. at 19–26 (explaining that humans have limited memory, 
computational skills, and other mental skills resulting in “bounded 
rationality”). 
145 See id. at 21 (arguing that group decisionmaking is an adaptive 
response to “bounded rationality”). 
146 See id. at 32–41. 
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complex challenges and increasing workload faced by today’s 
directors.147 
 While collective boards are overall more beneficial than 
relying on a sole actor/director, it is also true that 
decisionmaking processes by human collectives create certain 
negative dynamics. Putting a group in charge of a company, 
as opposed to a single individual, may lead to difficulties in 
monitoring and measuring individual team members’ 
performance, can cause problems that flow from the 
complexities of interpersonal team dynamics, and creates a 
potential for free-riding on the efforts of others by certain 
group members.148 Moreover, a particular concern related to 
decisionmaking in teams is the social-psychological problem 
of “groupthink,” where a collective’s preference for 
maintaining harmony and conformity within its group leads 
to irrational or dysfunctional decisions.149   
In light of these challenges to the model of the collective 
board, countervailing board governance practices have been 
developed. Two particularly significant of these measures are 
the independent director model and—more recently—a focus 
on board diversity. Indeed, the currently prevailing 
monitoring board model favors independent directors as a way 
to improve oversight and reduce agency costs.150 Independent 
directors are expected to be better suited to act as impartial 
monitors as compared to insiders who may be conflicted or 
simply lacking an objective view of the companies they are an 
 
147 See id. at 12–41. 
148 See id. at 28, 40. 
149 Id. at 32 (footnote omitted) (“Highly cohesive groups . . . value 
consensus more than they do a realistic appraisal of alternatives. In such 
groups, groupthink is an adaptive response to the stresses generated by 
challenges to group solidarity. To avoid those stresses, groups may strive 
for unanimity even at the expense of quality decision making.”). 
150 See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors 
in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market 
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). Independent directors are individuals 
that have no employment status or personal and other affiliations to the 
corporation. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain 
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. L. 
921, 923 (1999). 
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insider of.151 U.S. listed companies are now required to have a 
majority of independent directors on their boards and need to 
establish certain committees that are comprised only of 
independent directors.152 Similar rules apply in the U.K., 
where the Corporate Governance Code provides that “[t]he 
board should include an appropriate combination of executive 
and non-executive (and, in particular, independent non-
executive) directors, such that no one individual or small 
group of individuals dominates the board’s decision-
making”153 and requires that “at least half the board, 
excluding the chair, should be non-executive directors that the 
board regards as independent.”154   
In addition to the independence of a board’s directors, 
another factor to consider is the diversity of its members. The 
value of board diversity is thought to be supported by the idea 
that different leadership experiences and variations in 
gender, ethnicity, race, nationality and socio-economic 
backgrounds can provide effective means to tackle 
complacency, generate new ideas, and result in better risk 
management.155 This suggests that the reason for advancing 
board diversity is—as in the case of board independence—
primarily economic in nature, as better decisionmaking will 
lead to better financial outcomes for companies. Indeed, this 
“business case” has been the main argument advanced by 
policymakers in support of increased diversity, although 
diversity initiatives may also serve non-financial interests, 
 
151 See generally Gordon, supra note 150, at 1471. 
152 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, §§ 303A.01–303A.07 (2002). 
153 FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE 6 (July 2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-
4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-
FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/6EFM-Q2CW] (citing to Principle 2(G) and 
Provision 9).  
154 Id. at 9 (quoting Principle 2, Provision 11). Further provisions of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code call for fully independent or majority 
independent board committees. 
155 See MOORE & PETRIN, supra note 21, at 189. 
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including concerns surrounding societal equality.156 While 
recent regulatory initiatives have tended to focus on one 
specific aspect of diversity, namely, female board 
representation,157 some policies have targeted diversity more 
broadly. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
provides that board appointments and succession plans 
should, among other considerations, promote gender 
diversity, as well as diversity of social and ethnic 
backgrounds.158  
2. Boards Tomorrow 
The previous Section outlined the familiar characteristics 
of today’s boards that vest ultimate monitoring 
responsibilities and decisionmaking powers in a human 
collective with certain built-in checks designed to mitigate 
agency costs and weaknesses of team decisionmaking. Still, 
the board’s traditional structure will likely become 
superfluous in an age of AI dominated corporate governance. 
First, the multi-member board is set to vanish once AI is able 
to replicate the benefits of group decisionmaking by humans 
and exceed both the speed and quality of decisions made by 
human teams. Presumably, this development will in due 
course steer policymakers towards introducing legal reforms 
concerning board composition and appointments, allowing 
businesses to shift to AI boards and management. 
With the advent of advanced AI capable of assuming board 
functions, we should first expect to see boards shrink in size. 
Second, we should expect to see what can be called “fused 
 
156 See Barnali Choudhury, New Rationales for Women on Boards, 34 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 511, 512 (2014) (arguing that board diversity is 
supported on both economic/business and equality grounds).  
157 In the U.K., for instance, following amendments influenced by EU 
requirements, boards of companies are generally required to compile a 
strategic report that contains information including the female 
representation on the board and other hierarchical levels within the 
company. See The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1970, § 414C (UK).  
158 See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 153, at 8 
(referencing Principle 3(J)). 
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boards.” The term “fused” indicates that the characteristics of 
multiple members will be merged in and offered by a single 
entity, the “AI director.” Thus, the combined knowledge and 
skills, benefits of group-decisionmaking, and characteristics 
such as diversity and independence, which previously could 
only be offered by a collective, will be replicated in fused 
boards through an algorithm’s coding features. This AI 
director software could still be selected and “appointed” by 
shareholders, with an option to switch to another software 
system at regular intervals. 
Recall that boards consisting of groups are, overall, 
beneficial because group structures improve access to 
information, mitigate the effects of bounded rationality, and 
counter individual biases. Groups are also thought to be useful 
as its members can monitor each other and reduce agency 
costs within the board itself. Finally, groups allow for the 
delegation of responsibilities and help alleviate excessive 
workloads on individual directors.159 These reasons for 
adherence to the collective model of boards will, however, 
likely cease with the advent of sufficiently advanced AI.  
First, given the prevalence of online information, access to 
publicly available information will be comprehensive and 
virtually instant for AI systems. Indeed, information for 
today’s boards is already often collected and made available 
using IT systems—namely through internet portals, intranet 
solutions, electronic communication, and customized 
executive information systems.160 Thus, the next step towards 
creating direct feeds of this information to an artificial 
director seems natural. While such information feeds would 
cover publicly available information and non-public intra-
company information, it remains a question as to how an 
artificial director could gain access to non-public external 
information or knowledge that human directors may gather 
 
159 See supra Section  II.A.1. 
160 W. Bradley Zehner II, What Directors Need to Know, GRAZIADIO BUS. 
REV., Aug. 2010, at 1, 4, https://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/what-directors-
need-to-know [https://perma.cc/J2UZ-BHLZ] (“A carefully designed [web] 
portal can become the primary information source for a director or 
executive.”). 
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through their work on other boards or personal contacts. 
Although it may be difficult to gain access to such information 
for non-humans, it is not impossible. If AI software by leading 
providers could be used by (or “sit” on) a large number of 
boards, there would be scope allowing for arrangements that 
grant the software permission to cross-use certain data 
between different businesses. Similar to human directors with 
their own networks and sources of information, an AI director 
could then leverage the insights gained from “working” at 
multiple firms—perhaps tens of thousands of them as opposed 
to just a few in the case of a human director. 
Indeed, a future in which AI director/AI management 
software will be offered by large commercial providers could 
help harness and amplify the advantages described by 
Professors Bainbridge and Henderson of allowing specialized 
entities to act as directors.161 In their model, companies would 
replace individual directors with a single Board Service 
Provider (“BSP”), an entity which would then carry out all 
corporate board functions.162 These BSPs would arguably be 
well placed to avoid problems typically affecting individual 
directors, including time constraints, biases and cognitive 
limitations, group think, bounded rationality, lack of 
specialized knowledge, and motivational issues.163 A similar 
reasoning can be applied to AI directors. AI software could 
work around the clock, efficiently process information made 
available to it, recall and utilize this information almost 
instantly, and exercise its functions without asking to be 
 
161 See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1056. 
162 Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, 
OUTSOURCING THE BOARD 193 (2018) (further detailing and developing the 
BSP model). 
163 Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1064–68 (describing 
these issues); Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 162, at 190–202 
(discussing the “post-monitoring” board and the idea of the “thickly 
informed board,” that is, the notion that modern boards should be far more 
informed than it is the case today in order to better exercise its functions). 
On the thickly informed board, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Board 3.0—An Introduction, 74 BUS. L. 351, 361–63 (2019) (making the case 
for a new model of highly informed, more motivated, and better resourced 
directors).  
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personally compensated (although its services would not be 
free). Further, presuming that AI will operate without self-
interest, there is also no need to have multiple directors 
monitor each other in order to mitigate the effects of conflicted 
human behavior.  
At least theoretically, AI software could also be free from 
biases. Frey and Osborne have noted that “[c]omputerisation 
of cognitive tasks is . . . aided by another core comparative 
advantage of algorithms: their absence of some human biases” 
and suggested “that many roles involving decisionmaking will 
benefit from impartial algorithmic solutions.”164 As they 
explain, occupations that require “subtle judgement” are 
increasingly susceptible to computerization as “the unbiased 
decision making of an algorithm represents a comparative 
advantage over human operators.”165 Given these qualities, 
Frey and Osborne suggest that in addition to simply providing 
algorithmic recommendations to human operators, eventually 
“algorithms will themselves be responsible for appropriate 
decisionmaking.”166  
Yet, AI is only as good as its inputs and programming. As 
long as software is programmed by humans, it is vulnerable 
to our inherent biases.167 Indeed, recent developments in 
areas ranging from computerized hiring processes to the 
selection of neighborhoods for same day retail delivery and 
decisions on Medicaid payments have highlighted the problem 
of biased AI decisions.168 Thus, biases and other limitations 
 
164 Frey & Osborne, supra note 97, at 259. 
165 Id. at 260. 
166 Id.  
167 See, e.g., Anjanette H. Raymond et al., Building a Better Hal 9000: 
Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias, 15 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 223 (2018) (discussing various types of 
algorithmic biases and their impacts). 
168 See Madhumita Murgia, How to Stop Computers Being Biased, FIN. 
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/12dcd0f4-2ec8-11e9-
8744-e7016697f225 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) 
(discussing a discontinued pilot program for hiring at Amazon and Idaho’s 
failed Medicaid computer program); see also Sian Bradley, All The Creepy, 
Crazy and Amazing Things That Happened in AI in 2017, WIRED (Dec. 20, 
2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-happened-in-ai-in-2017 
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observed in humans will not automatically be eradicated 
through the use of AI in corporate management. Nevertheless, 
AI undeniably has the potential to reduce biases. As noted 
above, AI offers a promising potential in that it could be 
designed to be completely unbiased and lead to increased 
objectivity in decisionmaking.169  
B. Corporate Management 
Fused boards may be the beginning, but they will hardly 
be the last step in the evolution of corporate leadership. AI 
will likely also lead to the “fused management” of companies. 
 
[https://perma.cc/3A5A-LFL3] (providing examples of bias in AI); Tim 
Hartford, Expect Mischief as Algorithms Proliferate, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3b9977a0-35c5-11e9-bb0c-42459962a81 
(on file with Columbia Business Law Review) (discussing how algorithms 
can magnify human errors and even be “conspiring against us”).  
169 See Assaf Hamdani et al., Technological Progress and the Future of 
the Corporation, 6 J. BRITISH ACAD. 215, 229 (2018) (opining that “AI 
algorithms may become better on average at making governance decisions 
than individuals due to their superior ability to process information, 
freedom from biases, and lack of side interests”); see also John Armour & 
Horst Eidenmüller, Self-Driving Corporations? 6, 25–28 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 475/2019, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3442447 
[https://perma.cc/AT24-9GJD] (suggesting that future AI technology may 
permit humans to be replaced at the apex of corporate decision-making and 
that this will happen first in subsidiaries that perform limited corporate 
functions); Christopher M. Bruner, Distributed Ledgers, Artificial 
Intelligence, and the Purpose of the Corporation 10–11 (2019) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (stating that 
new technologies may reduce the need for human decision-making for a 
wide range of board-level tasks); but see Luca Enriques & Dirk A. Zetsche, 
Corporate Technologies and the Tech Nirvana Fallacy 30 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 457, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392321[https://perma.cc/4UJF-L5ES] (arguing 
that it is unlikely that new technologies will replace existing corporate 
governance mechanisms). Specifically on AI-management, Enriques and 
Zetsche opine that “[i]n sharp contrast with tech proponents’ predictions . . . 
the idea that CorpTech can make better board-level decisions than 
humanpopulated boards rests on an optimistic assessment of what 
technology can do and an overly simplistic view of a board’s functions.” Id. 
at 30. 
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This second type of fusion refers to the amalgamation of 
boards and managers, resulting in the abolishment of the  
two-tiered structure of governance of the modern corporation. 
In its place, an all encompassing “corporate management” 
body could emerge. This body would assume all of the 
functions of today’s directors and managers below the board 
level, but would operate without the separation between these 
two groups.  
The reasons supporting the likely emergence of fused 
management are principally that properly programmed 
corporate management AI software will entail no or 
drastically reduced agency costs,170 thus making one of the 
board’s main functions—to monitor or supervise managers—
far less important or completely obsolete. In addition, AI will 
not be subject to time restrictions, enabling it to carry out both  
boards’ traditional functions and the day-to-day managerial 
tasks that boards now delegate to managers. AI software will 
also not need to liaise with or appoint and terminate itself (as 
boards currently do with members of the management team) 
if  it, as a single unit, is in charge of managing the business.  
 
170 See John Armour et al., Putting Technology to Good Use for Society: 
The Role of Corporate, Competition and Tax Law, 6 J. BRITISH ACAD. 285, 
298 (2018) (“Digitalisation will permit more effective monitoring via a wider 
range of employee and manager performance measurement tools. In the 
medium to long run, the deployment of artificial intelligence raises the 
prospect of a significant reduction in agency costs within firms.” (internal 
quotation marks  omitted)); see also Hamdani et al., supra note 169, at 229 
(noting that machine learning and other new technologies may result in 
greatly reduced corporate agency costs); Akshaya Kamalnath, The 
Perennial Quest for Board Independence–Artificial Intelligence to the 
Rescue? ALBANY L. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3360349 
[https://perma.cc/9DYK-Q265] (discussing AI’s potential to enhance board 
independence by reducing agency costs). But cf. Enriques & Zetsche, supra 
note 169, at 58 (arguing that technology will not resolve intracorporate 
agency problems as long as—potentially conflicted—humans control its 
usage); Alan J. Dignam, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Human Dangers of 
Dysfunctional Design and Autocratic Corporate Governance 3 (Queen Mary 
Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 314, 2019),  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382342 [https://perma.cc/E6ZN-3QHY] 
(discussing problems related to flawed human design and implementation 
of AI in corporate decisionmaking). 
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With fused corporate management, functions including 
today’s appointment of directors, hiring and firing of 
management, and voice on executive remuneration would be 
broadly mirrored in the shareholders’ powers to choose a 
suitable AI management software package for their company. 
In doing so, shareholders would have to take into account the 
software’s features, its managerial characteristics, and the 
overall pricing associated with the package. In this respect, 
different types of and different options for AI management 
software could emerge, perhaps delineated in terms of their 
risk-aversion and the corporate purpose(s) that the software 
is designed to pursue.171 
C. Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
1. Liability Today 
Individual duties are the basis for today’s personal liability 
regime for those in charge of corporate leadership. Directors 
owe their company and, secondarily, their shareholders, the 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in discharging their 
functions.172 In essence, this means that directors are required 
to act in a competent manner and be loyal to their company. 
Corporate fiduciary duties often tend to be discussed with 
specific reference to directors (an approach that this Section 
will also mostly adhere to), as opposed to officers. 
Nevertheless, the duties of corporate officers are said to be 
identical with,173 or at least very similar to, those of directors, 
 
171 For more on the corporate purpose, see infra Section IV.D. 
172 See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 
(Del. 1989). On the content of these duties, see, for example, 1 R. FRANKLIN 
BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4.14–4.16 (3d ed. 2019). 
173 See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (en banc) 
(clarifying that the fiduciary duties of officers of Delaware corporations are 
the same as those of directors); Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 
752, 780 (Del. Ch. 2016). For further background, see Michael Follett, 
Gantler v. Stephens: Big Epiphany or Big Failure? A Look at the Current 
State of Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Advice for Potential Protection, 35 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 563 (2010); MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D&O 
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albeit they are generally considered to be more particularized. 
Officers are also subject to certain additional duties stemming 
from the general law of agency.174 In addition to the system of 
corporate fiduciary duties, officers can also be held personally 
liable for their misconduct through the channel of securities 
fraud litigation.175 This Section, however, will focus solely on 
fiduciary duty liability. 
The duty of care applies to two broad categories – the 
process of decision making and in boards’ exercise of their 
duties. In the words of Balotti and Finkelstein, “[f]irst, 
directors must exercise the requisite degree of care in the 
process of decision-making and act on an informed basis. 
Second, directors must also exercise due care in the other 
aspects of their responsibilities, including their delegation 
functions.”176 The traditional approach to describing the 
standard of care expected from directors is by way of reference 
to behavior displayed by other individuals in their position. 
For example, the Delaware Chancery Court has stated that 
“directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs 
are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful 
and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”177 In 
Delaware, however, only conduct that amounts to “gross 
negligence” will give rise to a violation of the duty of care.178 
It is also helpful to examine the standard of care applicable 
to directors in conjunction with the business judgment rule. 
Although the business judgment rule is more convincingly 
 
LIABILITY HANDBOOK § I:15 (2018) (summarizing officers’ liability for 
fiduciary duty breaches and the applicability of the business judgment rule 
to their actions). 
174 See Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 847, 848 (2017). 
175 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud 
as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
859, 860–61 (2003). 
176 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 172, at § 4.15 (footnote omitted). 
177 Graham v. Allis-Chambers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 
1963). 
178 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); see also McMullin 
v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000) (“Director liability for breaching the 
duty of care ‘is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.’”).  
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viewed as a standard of judicial review rather than a standard 
of care,179 the rule is, in practice, inextricably linked to what 
courts perceive as proper directorial conduct. That is, in 
making a business decision directors need to act “on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”180 
Boards also need to allow sufficient time to prepare and 
engage critically with the information made available to 
them.181 Nevertheless, as a Delaware law treatise notes, in 
formulating the standard of care expected from directors 
“[t]here are no hornbook bright lines or litmus tests to make 
counseling easy. Each case will depend on the procedural 
setting and all the facts.”182 
The duty of loyalty addresses and seeks to mitigate the 
problem of diverging interests between shareholders and 
those who manage the company.183 It requires corporate 
leaders to adhere to a standard of behavior that Judge 
Cardozo once artfully described as the “punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive.”184 Loyalty, in practice, is relevant to a 
variety of specific contexts, including interested-director 
transactions, corporate opportunities, insider transactions, 
and other situations that involve a potential conflict of 
interest or heightened risk of unduly advancing managers’ 
 
179 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as 
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87, 109–29 (2004); see also Moran 
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch. 1985) (“[T]he business 
judgment rule is primarily a tool of judicial review and only indirectly a 
[managerial] standard of conduct . . . .” ), aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).  
180 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that “[t]he 
business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial 
prerogatives of Delaware directors”). 
181 The seminal case on this is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 
(Del. 1985). 
182 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 172, at § 4.15(A) (footnote 
omitted). 
183 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (A classic case in 
which the court stated that the duty of loyalty “demands that there shall be 
no conflict between duty and self-interest”).  
184 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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personal interests at the expense of the corporation.185 
Notably, the board’s liability for failures to exercise proper 
oversight is, under Delaware law, also subsumed under the 
duty of loyalty and its requirement that directors act in good 
faith.186  
The system for sanctioning alleged breaches of corporate 
directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties is somewhat peculiar. 
In most cases, shareholders cannot bring direct claims against 
these individuals in their own name. Absent rare situations 
where there are injuries that directly affect certain 
shareholders in their individual capacities, breaches of 
fiduciary duties will be pursued either by the corporation 
(acting through the board) or—given the board’s likely 
reluctance to initiate such claims—via derivative actions that 
shareholders bring in the name and on behalf of the 
corporation.187 However, shareholders willing to pursue 
derivative suits face an uphill battle on numerous fronts. They 
have to overcome both procedural and substantive hurdles, 
which to a large degree work to insulate corporate directors 
and officers from personal liability.188  
Directors, in particular, benefit from various protections 
that considerably limit their personal exposure. With regard 
to assessing the existence of a breach of duty, corporate laws 
usually provide that directors may rely on information or 
 
185 See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 172, at § 4.16. 
186 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370–72 (Del. 2006); Martin Petrin, 
Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory 
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433 (2011) (discussing liability standards 
pertaining to oversight liability).  
187 See, e.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 969 
(Del. Ch. 1986) (applying principle that where an alleged wrong does not 
injure either the corporation or its majority shareholders, but only affects 
the minority shareholders, the claim is direct instead of derivative). 
Additionally, managers can be held accountable by non-shareholder third 
parties based on tort law principles. See Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of 
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for Supervision and Management: 
Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
1661, 1714 (2010). 
188 See Petrin, supra note 187, at 1693–94 (describing various 
protective mechanisms). 
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advice received from others, and that such reliance is, within 
certain limitations, permissible and will not expose the 
director to personal liability.189 More broadly, board decisions 
can be protected by the business judgment rule, which 
provides that courts will not second-guess directors’ actions as 
long as their decision making process meets certain criteria.190 
Delaware law even permits shareholders to adopt exculpatory 
provisions in their company’s certificate of incorporation to 
limit or eliminate directors’ personal liability for duty of care 
(but not loyalty) violations.191 These limitations, coupled with 
corporate indemnification arrangements and D&O liability 
insurance, have become so pronounced that the prospect of 
liability, especially that involving out-of-pocket payments by 
directors, has become unlikely.192 Officers are exposed to 
higher potential liability than directors, given that they are 
more deeply involved in daily management.193 Nevertheless, 
fiduciary duty lawsuits against officers have been rare and the 
 
189 Under the DGCL, directors may under specified conditions rely 
upon corporate records and information, opinions, reports, or statements 
presented to the corporation by officers, employees, board committees, or 
other persons. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2019). See also MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT §§ 8.30(e)–(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
190 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000). 
191 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2019). Note that § 102(b)(7) does 
not permit eliminating personal liability for breaches of the duty of care if 
the underlying acts or omissions were not in good faith.  Id. at § 102(b)(7)(ii). 
192 See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2010) (“[D]irectors and officers seldom face civil 
liability for breaching their fiduciary duties, regardless of the forum in 
which shareholders bring suit and despite corporate law rhetoric 
emphasizing the importance of executives’ fiduciary responsibilities.”); 
Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1140 
(2006) (suggesting that out of pocket payments by directors are as 
infrequent as an “occasional lightning strike”). 
193 Exculpatory charter provisions, at least under Delaware law, do not 
apply to officers and the question whether officers are protected by the 
business judgment rule remains unsettled. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 
182–84; DeMott, supra note 174, at 863 n.86; Follett, supra note 173, at 
565–66. Officers may however be statutorily entitled to indemnification and 
their corporation may have insurance in place to protect them from out of 
pocket payments.  
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chances of being held personally liable are low for them as 
well.194  
2. Liability Tomorrow 
As the overview above shows, the current system of 
managerial liability is first and foremost geared towards 
limiting personal transgressions—that is, misconduct by 
individuals that is careless or otherwise acts against the 
corporation’s and shareholders’ interests for selfish reasons. 
As a counterweight to managerial power, shareholder 
fiduciary duty litigation is meant to serve the goals of ex ante 
deterrence and, to a lesser degree, ex post compensation.195 
Thus, from a corporate governance perspective, derivative 
actions can be described as the counterweight to managerial 
power and a mitigation device against agency costs.196  
The current system’s characteristics raise questions about 
its suitability for a future shift from human to AI corporate 
management. Today’s framework is fundamentally based on 
the notion of personal accountability in holding corporate 
leaders that breach their fiduciary duties individually liable. 
Naturally, in the absence of human managers, this type of 
personal liability is bound to disappear.  
In the early stages of the gradual pathway towards AI 
dominated management we should expect AI to only take on 
certain roles—acting mostly as a supportive mechanism for 
human directors—which  may itself  lead to a reduction in the 
number of human managers. As a consequence, during this 
early phase, personal liability lawsuits would be increasingly 
 
194 See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate 
Officers are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1609 (2004); see also 
Shaner, supra note 45, at 367 (confirming empirically the low number of 
fiduciary duty lawsuits against officers). 
195 See, e.g., 2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 12 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald 
E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a 
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 302–05 (1981). 
196 See, e.g., DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS 314 (2nd ed. 2012) (noting that fiduciary duties may “allow the 
agency cost to be drained away”). 
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concentrated on  fewer individuals, namely those humans that 
still remain in managerial positions, which in turn heightens 
their potential exposure.  
This stage raises difficult questions regarding the extent 
to which human managers may delegate tasks to and rely on 
advice given by AI (in the sense of there being relief from 
liability) and, relatedly, the extent to which they can and 
should monitor AI. Whether reliance and delegation of tasks 
to AI is permissible depends on the wording and 
interpretation of applicable statutory provisions and 
corporate documents.197 Typically, corporate law requires 
directors to monitor delegees and does not allow boards to 
delegate away the core duty to manage and supervise the 
company.198 Thus, under the current framework, a complete 
delegation of tasks to AI would not be allowed. Partial 
delegation would be possible, but would require the board to 
oversee the managerial activities of AI. Accordingly, a 
commentator has noted that directors would be required to “at 
least generally oversee the selection and activities of robots, 
algorithms and artificial intelligence devices” and “have a 
basic understanding of how these devices operate.”199 While 
directors may “not understand their coding in every detail, 
 
197 See Möslein, supra note 104, at 656–60; see also Petrin, supra note 
187, at 1693–94. 
198 See Möslein, supra note 104, at 659. 
199 Id. at 660. Möslein also considers the questions whether directors 
could become obliged to use or delegate tasks to AI as part of their duty act 
on an informed basis, concluding that it is possible that such a duty might 
develop in the near future, along with the more general board task of 
exercising “governance of artificial intelligence.” Id. at 660–62; see also 
Shani R. Else & Francis G.X. Pileggi, Corporate Directors Must Consider 
Impact of Artificial Intelligence for Effective Corporate Governance, BUS. L. 
TODAY (Feb. 12, 2019), https://businesslawtoday.org/2019/02/corporate-
directors-must-consider-impact-artificial-intelligence-effective-corporate-
governance [https://perma.cc/UZ84-E36Y] (“[I]t is crucial that the board 
does not delegate its essential management functions and rely solely upon 
AI in making decisions for the corporation. Doing so would be a prohibited 
delegation of its duties.”). 
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they should at least be able to understand the technical 
guidelines that drive these machines.”200 
Following a phase of co-existence of human and AI 
managers, a subsequent phase will likely see machines fully 
take over corporate management. At this point, humans could 
no longer be sued for breaching their fiduciary duties. This 
could lead to three possible new approaches to managerial 
liability: (1) artificial entities acting as managers could 
become potential defendants and be sued; (2) the system of 
managerial liability will be abolished and not replaced; or (3) 
those responsible for creating, distributing, or selling artificial 
managers (in the form of AI software and hardware) will 
replace managers as possible defendants.201  
Under the first possibility, AI systems could be made 
available as defendants in shareholder and/or third-party 
lawsuits. This approach could consist of actions against AI 
operating either in the form of familiar types of organizational 
legal entities (such as a corporation or LLC where AI acts as 
a management/board service provider), or AI that in the 
future might itself be bestowed with a novel legal 
personality.202 In both cases, from the perspective of plaintiffs, 
 
200 Möslein, supra note 104, at 660. 
201 Note that the following does not relate to the corporation’s own 
liability (direct or vicarious) vis-à-vis third parties for harm caused by its 
algorithmic decisionmaking. While I do not wish to exclude this option, see 
supra note 192 and accompanying text, a more detailed discussion of this 
kind of liability is beyond the scope of this article’s focus on managers’ 
individual responsibility. On the entity’s own liability for AI, see Armour & 
Eidenmüller, supra note 169, at 31–33. 
202 On the idea of creating a legal status for artificial persons, see 
generally Matthew U. Scherer, Of Wild Beasts and Digital Analogues: The 
Legal Status of Autonomous Systems, 19 NEV. L.J. 259, 260 (2018); Gunther 
Teubner, Digital Personhood? The Status of Autonomous Software Agents in 
Private Law, 2018 ANCILLA IURIS 107, 112–13 (2018); Robert van den Hoven 
van Genderen, Legal Personhood in the Age of Artificially Intelligent Robots, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 213 
(Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal 
Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (1992). On 
the European Parliament’s recent proposals regarding digital personhood, 
see Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with Recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 2015/2103 (INL), 5, 12 (May 31, 
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the main difference as compared to today’s system is that their 
claims would be directed against a non-human, although still 
a legally recognized entity. In terms of the potential for 
plaintiffs’ financial recovery, the difference would depend on 
two factors. First, whether these new entities would enjoy 
similar legal protections as human managers, in the familiar 
forms of liability insulating corporate law norms or other, new 
legal protections. While today’s exculpatory provisions could 
be quite easily adapted to machines or AI, the business 
judgment rule would have to be reformulated. Second, 
recovery by plaintiffs would also be influenced and potentially 
limited by these entities’ financial resources (or, rather, likely 
lack thereof). Thus, how to define and monitor applicable 
standards of behavior (consisting essentially of ex ante coding 
standards for AI management software) will be difficult 
questions in the context of liability for AI entities.203  
The second option would be completely abolishing personal 
liability for corporate managers. This loss of the possibility of 
holding managers liable could have a number of 
consequences. First, there is the question as to whether the 
absence of potential personal liability and the corresponding 
lack of deterrence would make managers less careful. 
However, deterrence would arguably be difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve for AI entities. It would likely also be 
unnecessary for a properly programmed artificial entity, 
which can be instructed to always adhere to the required legal 
norms. Second, plaintiffs would lose a class of potential 
defendants, and hence a potential pool of assets that could 
help compensate shareholders and/or their companies in cases 
 
2016), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-PR-
582443_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9DQ-KC2D]; Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies, European Civil Law Rules in Robotics, PE 571.379, 14 
(Oct. 2016), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571379/IPOL
_STU(2016)571379_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P7Q-8H5R].  
203 Möslein has suggested that governmental control of algorithms and 
new enforcement mechanisms may be needed “because the control of 
algorithms requires a comprehensive technical know-how that can neither 
be expected from shareholders, nomination committees or supervisory 
boards, nor from courts . . . .” Möslein, supra note 104, at 667. 
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of damages. Yet, given the already low success rate of lawsuits 
against managers,204 such a loss of personal liability would be 
limited in its impact, at least in the case of public companies. 
Furthermore, companies which use AI management systems 
would still have the option to bring direct actions against 
third-party AI software providers based on contractual claims. 
Contrary to today’s problem that boards may be reluctant to 
bring actions against fellow directors or managers,205 boards 
would face no such concern when it comes to third parties that 
provided an allegedly faulty product or service. This may lead 
to more lawsuits and financial recovery. The biggest change 
in liability exposure, however, would likely be felt in non-
shareholder third party claims against the corporation, 
particularly those based on torts or criminal and regulatory 
offenses. In these cases, all liability would necessarily have to 
be channeled to the corporate entity itself as its managers 
would be unavailable as (exclusive, or, together with the 
entity, joint) defendants.206  
The third option for a future corporate liability framework 
is that the creators, distributors, sellers, or other providers of 
managerial AI software (the “AI providers”) would become the 
primary potential defendants in cases of claims previously 
directed towards managers.207 In addition to exposure to 
claims brought by corporations using their AI software, novel 
rules could allow shareholders and potentially third parties to 
sue AI providers directly or derivatively. Such a system may 
even impose a new fiduciary status for software developers, as 
 
204 See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text. 
205 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, 
and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 839 (2007) (discussing demand 
requirements in derivative suits). 
206 The same is true for (rare) instances of direct claims by shareholders 
against directors. 
207 This would be in addition to claims that corporations that use their 
AI management systems users might bring against them, based on 
contractual or extra-contractual grounds and in cases where due to faults 
in the system the corporation suffered direct or indirect harm. On potential 
problems with this approach, see Armour & Eidenmüller, supra note 169, 
at 34 n.88. 
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one commentator has recently suggested.208 These claims 
would not focus on whether an individual was in breach of his 
or her duties, as they currently do, but rather whether the 
relevant software was properly designed and programmed. 
This suggests that, under this model, liability for corporate 
management will evolve akin to today’s system of products 
liability, especially as it currently applies to software 
programs. Thus, liability could be based on theories of implied 
warranty, negligence, “programming malpractice,” or even 
strict liability.209 Again, as for direct claims against AI-
management entities, this third option necessitates clarity on 
the appropriate standards for AI management.210 
D. Corporate Purpose 
For decades, scholars, judges, and policymakers have 
grappled with defining the corporation’s proper purpose and 
objectives.211 In essence, the main question over which there 
is disagreement concerns the extent to which businesses 
should pursue or take into account the interests of non-
 
208 See Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust: Software Developers as 
Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-
SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 58, 59 (Philipp Hacker et al., eds., 2019). 
209 For a comprehensive overview of theories of liability in traditional 
products liability law, see CHARLES J. NAGY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY §§ 1:9–1:20 (3d ed. 2019).  
210 As mentioned above, the rise of artificial managers might coincide 
with the rise of large commercial providers of corporate management 
software, given the advantages of scale in terms of data collection. However, 
size may also be beneficial from a liability perspective. Large, deeply 
capitalized providers with a widely used product will be in a better position 
to avoid liability though better services but also to withstand financial 
strains in the case of liability payouts, including through external insurance 
solutions. 
211 Particularly well known is the debate between Merrick Dodd and 
Adolf Berle in the twenty-seven pages of the Harvard Law Review in 1932. 
See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1160–61 (1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom 
Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367, 1372 
(1932). 
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shareholder third parties and the public in discharging their 
corporate duties.  
Contemporary debates “tend to revolve around two schools 
of thought: shareholder wealth maximization, which is often 
linked to the . . . nexus of contracts model, and the stakeholder 
model.”212 The nexus of contracts theory provides that the 
corporate purpose is exclusively geared towards shareholders’ 
financial interests, whereas considerations of extraneous 
interests are subordinated as matters that should be 
regulated through non-corporate laws.213 In this view, the 
default position is that corporate managers have an obligation 
to maximize shareholder wealth.214 Shareholders, under this 
model, are in a privileged position because they provide the 
business capital that is at risk.  
In contrast to the shareholder primacy view, the 
stakeholder model and other pluralist perspectives on 
corporations focus on the idea that businesses have 
responsibilities not only to shareholders, but also to a variety 
of other constituents.215 These constituencies, which include 
groups such as employees, communities, and governments, 
are regarded under this theory as corporate stakeholders. It 
is contended by pluralists’ that the resources and various 
investments of these different types of corporate stakeholders 
in the corporation, financial or non-financial in nature, 
deserve to be protected to the same extent as shareholder 
interests.216 The corporate purpose is thus widened and 
corporate managers’ are thought to owe duties to both 
shareholders and non-shareholders. Indeed, because the focus 
on shareholder value is relaxed or abandoned under this 
theory, even corporate decisions or actions that may run 
 
212 BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE 
PUBLIC 37–46 (2019) (discussing the diverging views). 
213 Id. at 39. 
214 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2003); FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 36–39, 92–93 (1991). 
215 See CHOUDHURY & PETRIN, supra note 212, at 41–43. 
216 See id. at 42. 
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against shareholder interests may be allowed to some 
extent.217 
The traditional, entrenched position in Anglo-American 
law is that corporations serve the overarching aim of 
maximizing, or at least enhancing in the long term, 
shareholder wealth as measured by the price of its shares.218 
Nevertheless, the corporate purpose debate has never been 
conclusively settled and continues on to today, with some 
commentators noting that apart from the normative debates, 
even the corporate law “on the books” is ambiguous on the 
question of the corporate purpose.219 The recent wave of anti-
corporate sentiment and political upheaval suggests that the 
corporate purposes debate appears to be at a watershed 
moment, and more clarifications and changes geared towards 
regaining public trust in business appear necessary to ensure 
the continued success of the corporate model.220  
The need for more definitive answers may become even 
more pressing in a world with AI corporate management. 
After all, in order to function autonomously, AI will need 
clearly defined goals and outcomes.221 Non-committal 
statements about corporate missions or divides between 
public messaging and internal actions will be more difficult to 
sustain if the corporate purpose is made explicit in the 
algorithms of an organization’s managerial software. 
Stakeholders and the public at large may also become even 
more focused on, and more critical of, the behavior and 
underlying purpose of corporations once the human element 
in their leadership disappears and is replaced by AI. Machine-
managed corporations of the future will have to do even more 
 
217 Id. at 42.  
218 Id. at 38. 
219 See id. at 49–51. 
220 See id. at 18–21. 
221 See also Armour & Horst Eidenmüller, supra note 169, at 29 
(emphasizing the increased need for corporate goal specification and goal 
setting in AI-managed companies). 
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to gain the trust and confidence of the public to sustain its 
“social contract” with members of society more generally. 222 
On the positive side, AI managers will have a significant 
advantage over today’s managers: AI can process and consider 
a much higher volume of complex information than humans. 
This is relevant in light of a line of reasoning in corporate 
scholarship that posits that it is best to let managers focus on 
a singular goal—shareholder wealth maximization—instead 
of requiring managers to simultaneously pursue other 
stakeholders’ interests. Management, it is argued, cannot and 
should not be forced to serve two or more masters. Profit 
maximization as a singular goal, some commentators have 
opined, limits managers’ discretion to further their own self-
interests, provides clear aims for them to pursue, and 
eliminates the distractions and costs associated with  having 
to reconcile conflicting interests.223  
However, unlike human managers, AI would be able to 
work towards multiple goals, weakening the argument for 
letting managers focus on only one group’s interests. With AI 
in charge of management, the idea that businesses should 
“optimize within constraints” and focus simultaneously on 
multiple performance objectives—for instance, certain levels 
of profit and revenue growth, employee satisfaction, etc.—will 
become achievable.224 The need to consider multiple and 
 
222 On the idea that corporations holds a license, in the form of a social 
contract, from the public, see for example THOMAS DONALDSON, 
CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 37 (1982). For a discussion of the impact of 
technologies on the corporate purpose, see also Bruner, supra note 169, at 
14–19. 
223 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder 
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., 8, 
10–11 (2001); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role 
of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1161, 1191–1192 (1981); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 32 (1991); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL. J. 
L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 12 (2002). 
224 See Lynn Stout, The Corporation and the Question of Time, in 
UNDERSTANDING THE COMPANY 306–10 (Barnali Choudhury & Martin 
Petrin, eds., 2017); Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The 
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varied interests in corporate decision-making could be 
incorporated and precisely specified, to some extent even 
quantified, in the relevant algorithms. To facilitate 
monitoring, and potentially also legal claims, shareholders 
and other interested parties could even be given access to data 
and logs that show if and how these considerations have 
influenced a decision. At a more basic level, corporate conduct 
and “responsible corporate behaviour” could also be improved 
through simpler coding features. For instance, AI software 
could be given the task to learn and comply with all applicable 
laws. This delegation would prevent the occurrence of 
accounting and similar scandals involving deliberate 
misfeasance that peaked around the turn of the 
millennium.225 
E. Legal Entity Innovation 
In the previous Part, the Article described the 
consequences of AI management still based on the underlying 
assumption that ultimate control of AI-led businesses would 
remain with human shareholders. Some commentators have, 
however, recently drawn our attention to another 
possibility—the emergence of businesses that might operate 
without any ongoing human involvement, namely the 
phenomenon of algorithmic entities and leaderless entities. 
These two concepts will be discussed in turn in the following 
Sections.   
1. Algorithmic Entities 
There are already algorithms that, once programmed and 
released, can act and survive autonomously, with computer 
 
Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 605–11 
(2018) (both applying insights from systems theory to the corporate purpose 
debate and arguing that corporations can be viewed as a system pursuing 
multiple goals). 
225 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Director Inattention and Director 
Protection under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7): A 
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 695, 695–96 (2008) 
(discussing various high-profile corporate scandals). 
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viruses being a familiar example.226 It is also conceivable that 
advanced forms of such algorithms could conduct business. An 
algorithm “could roam the Internet with its own wallet and its 
own capacity to learn and adapt, in pursuit of its goals 
determined by a creator, purchasing the resources it requires 
to survive like computer power, all the while selling services 
to other entities.”227 Still, algorithms are not legal entities, 
which limits their practical use and ability to transact 
business. Legal scholars have, however, explored a 
sophisticated and particularly intriguing variant of the 
autonomous algorithm in considering so-called Algorithmic 
Entities,228 which combine algorithms with legal entities.  
AEs are comprised of a legal entity that provides the shell 
for a software/algorithm that controls the entity without any 
human participation.229 The importance of an algorithm’s 
ability to control a legal entity is that it creates legal rights for 
the algorithm and enables and legitimizes its ability to 
transact in the “real world.” As LoPucki has noted, the legal 
entity’s rights effectively become the algorithm’s rights.230 An 
AE could therefore enjoy rights such as the right to privacy, to 
own property, to enter into contracts, to be represented by 
counsel, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, to 
equal protection of the laws, to speak freely, and to spend 
money on political campaigns.231 Possessing these rights 
would allow an AE to “participate effectively in legitimate 
economic and political activity” and “engage in business, 
accumulate wealth, or deal with people in the above-ground 
 
226 See DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION 122 
(2016). 
227 Id. (referring to this type of algorithm as an “autonomous agent”). 
228 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 
890–91 (2018); see also Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern 
Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015). 
229 See LoPucki, supra note 228, at 897. 
230 Id. at 890. 
231 Id. at 890–91 (footnotes omitted). 
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economy.”232 This opens up entirely new opportunities for 
AEs. 
From a practical standpoint, self-managed AEs are already 
conceivable when it comes to relatively simple commercial 
applications. That is, today’s algorithms, commentators have 
opined, could autonomously and self-sufficiently run 
profitable businesses.233 It is possible to imagine that this 
could be quite easily achieved for a number of activities 
similar to those already identified as possible activities for 
algorithmic entities: cloud storage, bike rental, online 
gambling, vending machine operation, and services similar to 
those of Uber and Airbnb.234 As AI evolves, more complex 
ventures will be within reach. New generations of algorithms 
will likely be able to upgrade their own software, adapt to new 
business models, and discover and enter new industries.235 
From a legal standpoint, hurdles remain. Among others, 
the current prevalence of corporate laws that restrict board 
membership to natural persons would seem to contradict AEs. 
Of course, there could be legal reform, however, scholars have 
shown how AEs may already be conceivable under existing 
legal frameworks in the U.S., U.K., and Germany.236 For 
instance, LoPucki concluded that “formation of AEs is 
probably possible under the LLC statutes of all, or nearly all, 
U.S. jurisdictions” and “the formation of AEs is probably 
possible under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the 
Model Business Corporation Act, the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 
and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.”237 Nevertheless, 
there is considerable uncertainty regarding the legality of AEs 
 
232 Id. at 902. 
233 Id. at 891. 
234 See id. 
235 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 226, at 123. 
236 See LoPucki, supra note 228. See also Bayern, supra note 228; 
Shawn Bayern et al., Company Law and Autonomous Systems: A Blueprint 
for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 
135, 136, 139, 149 (2017). 
237 LoPucki, supra note 228, at 906. 
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since to date neither legislatures nor courts in the U.S. seem 
to have considered or condoned them. 
The possible consequences of AEs and their activities are 
also uncertain. On the positive side, AEs could be initiated to 
support and provide benefits to specific groups or causes, or to 
otherwise pursue beneficial impacts.238 However, LoPucki has 
expressed fear that because of AE’s ability to replicate, 
absence of human compassion, and difficulties in locating and 
punishing them, “AEs’ greatest comparative advantage would 
be in criminal enterprise.” 239 It is therefore possible that AEs 
will be used for illegal or otherwise highly undesirable 
activities including terrorism, harassment, malicious acts, 
political manipulation, and liability avoidance.240 In the face 
of these potential threats, LoPucki has argued in favor of 
drastic legal reform measures, specifically in the form of 
increased regulation and an end to the system of state 
competition for corporate chartering, which may contribute to 
weaker regulatory regimes pertaining to legal entities.241  
2. Leaderless Entities 
Finally, a discussion of the management of future firms 
should also consider whether the very concept of corporate 
management will survive at all. A challenge to the current 
conception of management is brought about by the idea of new 
business entities that purportedly function without 
leadership in the traditional sense. These are referred to as 
Distributed Autonomous Enterprises (“DAEs”) or Distributed 
Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”), and are often examined 
in the context of blockchain and AI technologies.242 Blockchain 
is thought to be able to provide the basic architecture to 
render centralized management unnecessary through self-
executing smart contracts, information and transparency, 
 
238 See id. at 891. 
239 Id. at 891–92. 
240 Id.  
241 Id. at 951–53.  
242 See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 
679, 679 (2019). 
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security, and other attributes that facilitate coordination 
between different parties.243  
Several commentators have emphasized the positive 
characteristics of DAEs. Yochai Benkler, for example, has 
expressed sympathies for blockchain technology that “can 
enable people to function together with the persistence and 
stability of an organization, but without the hierarchy.”244 
Similarly, authors Don and Alex Tapscott have outlined the 
advantages of entities that are “powered by blockchain 
technology and cryptocurrencies, where autonomous agents 
can self-aggregate into radically new models of the 
enterprise.”245 Such an entity could be “a corporation without 
executives, only shareholders, money, and software. Code and 
algorithms could replace a layer of representatives (i.e., the 
executive board), with shareholders exerting control over that 
code.”246 As Tapscott and Tapscott further write: 
This organization could have shareholders, possibly 
millions of them who participated in a crowdfunding 
campaign. The shareholders provide a missions 
statement, say, to maximize profit lawfully, while 
treating all stakeholders with integrity. Shareholders 
could also vote as required to govern the entity. As 
opposed to traditional organizations, where humans 
make all decisions, in the ultimate distributed 
organization much of the day-to-day decision making 
can be programmed into clever code. In theory, at 
least, these entities can run with minimal or no 
traditional management structure, as everything and 
 
243 See Laila Metjahic, Deconstructing the DAO: The Need for Legal 
Recognition and the Application of Securities Laws to Decentralized 
Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533, 1537–46 (2018) (explaining that 
“[a] decentralized organization operates under the same basic concepts of a 
corporation but has a decentralized management structure—eliminating 
the board of directors, for example”).  
244 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 226, at 107 (citing interview with 
Yochai Benkler, Faculty Co-Director, Berkman Klein Center for Internet 
and Society, Harvard Law School). 
245 Id. at 127. 
246 Id. 
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everyone works according to specific rules and 
procedures coded in smart contracts.247 
There are already some examples of DAEs in practice. One 
of them is ConsenSys, a software development company 
specializing principally in applications for Ethereum, a 
blockchain based platform.248 ConsenSys describes its 
organizational approach as “decentralized[,]” and 
“collaborative rather than hierarchical[,]”—and inspired by 
the principles of holacracy.249 Elements of this approach 
include “distributed, not delegated authority;” an overarching 
plan that has been developed and agreed on by all employees 
or members; dynamic roles that do not need to adhere to 
traditional job descriptions; project-based work organized 
around smaller teams that communicate and collaborate with 
each other; and flexible forms of compensation (such as 
bounties for completion of tasks, annual salaries, or 
performance based compensation schemes).250 As a co-founder 
of ConsenSys explained, his main operational role is limited 
to that of an advisor that suggests directions and priorities.251 
Only occasionally is there a need to “suggest that a certain 
thing really needs to get done” and potentially hire external 
third parties or incentivize internal employees to do it.252  
Another widely known example of a DAE, Slock.it, suffered 
from fatal flaws and ultimately failed.253 Although its demise 
was due to other reasons—exploitation of a weakness in the 
 
247 Id. at 126. 
248 See CONSENSYS, https://consensys.net/solutions 
[https://perma.cc/DA2J-TAU9] (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). 
249 See Sean Tahery, The Decentralized Org Structure, CONSENSYS 
COLLEGE CONSORTIUM (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@consensys_uni/the-decentralized-org-structure-
376bee0544cf [https://perma.cc/M62K-PLNG]; see also TAPSCOTT & 
TAPSCOTT, supra note 226, at 88; Bodie, supra note 39 (generally on 
holocracy as a corporate governance system).  
250 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 226, at 88–90 (citing co-founder 
Joe Lubin). 
251 See id. at 89. 
252 Id. at 90. 
253 See Rodrigues, supra note 242, at 697–706. 
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entity’s coding by a user—even one of its founders noted that 
the enterprise’s leaderless structure did not work well in 
practice.254 To be sure, DAEs can implement any governance 
structure that its members see fit, and future autonomous 
entities would not need to adopt Slock.it’s decisionmaking 
mechanisms, which were quite rudimentary.255  
Slock.it’s failure is by itself not the final word on DAEs, but 
it highlights some of the potential risks and shortcomings of 
business entities that operate without centralized managerial 
structures. Indeed, leaderless or self-managed collectives are 
unlikely to prevail in the future, at least on a broad scale apart 
from certain niche areas where ultra-flat hierarchies could be 
useful—specifically software and other internet-based work 
and projects. Overall, despite the superior capabilities of 
machines, it seems likely that larger business organizations 
will generally continue to benefit from centralized control and 
that shareholders will normally tend to remain almost 
completely passive, their role reduced to providers of capital 
and recipients of dividend streams.  
This is not to say that centralized, hierarchical governance 
structures are without flaws and should not be further 
tweaked and improved.256 However, only if technology can 
drastically reduce the limitations that make self-governance 
of business entities unfeasible today—including apathy, 
information asymmetries, and collective action problems—
can DAEs become viable as widespread alternative 
organizational models or even replace centrally managed 
entities. Even commentators like Tapscott and Tapscott, who 
are generally enthusiastic about DAEs, acknowledge that 
completely distributed enterprises would be challenging and 
perhaps not even practical, unless a way to implement 
appropriate decision-making and consensus driving 
mechanisms can be found.257 Currently, it seems more likely 
 
254 See Christoph Jentzsch, The History of the DAO and Lessons 
Learned, SLOCK.IT BLOG (Aug. 24, 2016), https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-
the-dao-and-lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5 [https://perma.cc/VQW7-DV6E]. 
255 See id. 
256 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 226, at 106–07. 
257 Id. at 127–28. See also Bruner, supra note 169, at 16. 
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that technology will revolutionize and improve corporate 
management rather than lead to its demise.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
A future in which AI takes over corporate management is 
possible. Recent developments and news stories show that 
there is an effort underway to develop, and an interest to 
pursue further, machine-led corporate leadership. Because AI 
management will presumably at some point be both better 
and more cost-effective than the use of human managers, 
“management by machine” seems inevitable. Well known 
commentators have warned of the dangers of AI, with the late 
Stephen Hawking predicting that full AI could lead to the end 
of mankind.258 In comparison, this Article’s premise that AI 
will replace corporate management is far more modest.  
Based on the assumption that AI management will 
eventually indeed materialize, the Article has hypothesized 
about its consequences for corporate governance. With 
software and machines in charge, the need for a collective 
board will vanish, which will be replaced with a single “fused” 
corporate management function. The shift from human to AI-
based management will equally necessitate changes to the 
system of managerial liability. In this area, we could see a 
system akin to products liability replace the framework of 
fiduciary and other personal duties. The fundamental purpose 
of corporations could also be influenced by AI management, 
which will allow more complex and precise calibrations of 
corporate objectives, along with the potential for increased 
clarity and transparency surrounding their pursuit of 
corporate objectives. Finally, the emergence of algorithmic 
entities, legal entities that operate without any human input 
whatsoever, seems plausible, if not limited in their 
practicality.  
 
258 Joao Medeiros, Stephen Hawking: ‘I fear AI May Replace Humans 
Altogether’, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/stephen-
hawking-interview-alien-life-climate-change-donald-trump 
[https://perma.cc/QWX6-4CS3]. 
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While this Article has not taken a normative stance, but 
focused on describing current and possible future 
developments of corporate governance structures in response 
to the rise of AI, it seems clear that there will be a need for 
legal reform to accommodate changes brought about by new 
technologies. These reforms should be both enabling—
facilitating the efficiencies and other beneficial effects of AI 
management—but also restrictive, protecting society from 
potential negative impacts, loss of employment, and other 
harmful actions by rogue AI entities. From a broader 
corporate governance perspective, it seems clear that the 
future of corporate management will be heavily intertwined 
with the consideration of business analytics, big data, and 
programming. 
The prospect of AI management also suggests the 
likelihood of change in the study of agency costs as an 
important theoretical underpinning of corporate governance 
theory. Agency costs between shareholders and management, 
this Article suggests, could be solved with AI management. 
However, the development of ex ante standards for designing, 
controlling, and holding accountable algorithms instead will 
likely take center stage. This can be thought of as a novel type 
of agency costs, now between humans and machines, which 
may come to the fore.259 On all counts, AI management seems 
set to initiate a new chapter for corporate law and governance. 
 
 
259 See BOSTROM, supra note 107, at 127–29. See also Armour & Horst 
Eidenmüller, supra note 169, at 7 (arguing that machines on corporate 
boards will lead to a “fundamental shift in focus, from controlling internal 
costs . . . to the design of appropriate strategies for controlling the costs that 
corporate activity imposes on persons external to the endeavor”). 
